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Introduction and summary
The purpose of the Center for American Progress plan for long-term deficit reduc-
tion is to build a strong American economy that provides the best opportunities 
for personal success of any country in the world, strengthens and builds a thriving 
middle class, and secures the position of the United States as the leading nation of 
the 21st century. To achieve these goals, federal budget deficits must be brought 
under control to keep credit markets strong and interest payments to foreign 
creditors low. But a balanced federal budget is far from all that is needed.
America must also invest in its economic future to achieve the economy we 
envision. Most of America’s investments are made by businesses and individu-
als, but the federal government plays critical roles as a direct investor in areas 
such as education, basic science, technology, and infrastructure, and as a catalyst 
for private investment. Without it effectively playing these roles U.S. economic 
growth will be weak, America will no longer be the global leader it is today, and 
all Americans will lose.
Central to our strategy is investing in the middle class. The America we know was 
built by middle-class workers and consumers, innovators, and entrepreneurs. The 
fortunes of the Forbes 400 have their roots in the opportunities our country has 
offered those in the middle class. Policies that invest in the middle class are invest-
ments in a successful American economy.
The public sector’s contribution to the economy we envision, however, goes 
beyond balanced budgets and investments. An economy must have a basic set of 
rules and protections that ensure trust and confidence in the marketplace. This 
role ranges from policing insider trading on Wall Street, to enforcing contracts, to 
ensuring that our food and medicine are safe. Certainly there is such a thing as too 
much regulation. But, as the recent financial market disaster painfully reminds us, 
there is also such thing as too little. 
2 center for American progress | Budgeting for Growth and prosperity
Our economic success also depends on the effective and efficient provision of the 
public services on which the nation relies. Finally, the tax system’s incentives and 
disincentives should enhance economic growth and address the growing inequal-
ity that undermines our national prosperity.
While the central motivation for the reforms we propose is the long-term success 
of the American economy, our plan also achieves several objectives motivated by 
other values. There are national responsibilities 
that simply must be honored whatever their 
economic payoff, among them:
•	 National security
•	 Public safety and health
•	 Preventing destitution
•	 Honoring valued national commitments, 
including those to the elderly and disabled
Achieving all of these objectives requires a 
numerical balancing, but it also requires an 
extremely challenging political balancing. The 
honest public debate over spending cuts and 
tax increases is in its infancy, with a long road 
ahead before there will be sufficient political 
space for the compromises that must be made 
in order to achieve a fully balanced federal 
budget. There is, at this point, no legislative 
path forward without broader agreement than 
is now possible. While some deficit reduc-
tion plans circulating in Washington appear to 
reach very low deficit levels quickly, the paths 
they offer are simply unrealistic. Our plan is 
designed with an eye on the political journey 
our nation will have to take and deliberately 
allows time for the building of a consensus for 
the major reforms that will be necessary.
We also must allow time for our economy 
to fully recover before administering the 
strongest deficit-slashing medicine. Deficit 
reduction that is too big, too fast would be 
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Figures 1 and 2
Our path from deficit to surplus
Federal budget deficit, as percent of gross domestic product,  
from 2012 to 2035 under the Center for American Progress plan
Shrinking the debt
Publicly held debt as a share of GDP, from 2012 to 2035,  
under the Center for American Progress plan
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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counterproductive—stalling growth and worsening our fiscal problems. Our 
most important national objective in the near term is to create jobs and get the 
economy back on track. 
For these reasons our plan is implemented in two distinct stages. The first stage 
hits a meaningful, but achievable, interim budget target of “primary balance” in 
2015—with revenues equal to spending except for interest payments on the debt. 
Starting in 2017 our plan enters a second phase aimed at achieving full balance 
while making needed investments. 
Projections using nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office-based methodologies 
reviewed by independent analysts show our plan fully balancing the budget by 
2030.1 (see Figures 1 and 2) It is our belief that the economic growth gained in the 
early years through deficit reduction, investments, and other measures will, in fact, 
lead to a balanced budget earlier than that year. Outlined below are the spending 
and revenue polices we use to achieve our objectives.
Spending
The federal government makes investments that are important to our economy, 
provides services to the public, and carries out a variety of activities necessary to 
a well-functioning society. Our spending plan is designed to do those things well, 
do them efficiently, and do them at the appropriate level of public expenditure. 
The CAP spending plan:
•	 Makes significant new investments in key areas such as education, infrastructure, 
science, technology, and energy research, as well as areas that strengthen our 
middle class
•	 Reduces spending while making it more efficient, maintaining public services 
that businesses and the public rely on, and ensuring our national defense 
through a reconfigured national security budget
•	 Strengthens the social safety net where needed
•	 Brings under control the most substantial spending challenge facing the 
country: health care 
The plan reduces spending from about 27 percent of gross domestic product in 
2030 in the extended Congressional Budget Office baseline—the official, nonpar-
tisan projection of our fiscal future—to under 24 percent of GDP. By 2035 spend-
ing is down to about 23 percent of GDP. 
4 center for American progress | Budgeting for Growth and prosperity
Investing to promote economic growth and a strong middle class
Starting in 2017 the CAP plan makes significant new investments in scientific research, 
all levels of education, clean energy technologies, and transportation and infrastruc-
ture—areas where nations around the world are making substantial commitments. Our 
plan makes major investments in strengthening the American middle class. All of these 
investments are necessities if the United States wants to avoid being surpassed as the 
country with the greatest opportunities, the best jobs, and the most powerful economy. 
They are essential if we want our nation to continue to be where the great ideas and 
the most innovation comes from, and remain a nation where entrepreneurs thrive and 
build successful businesses, large and small. 
Investments such as these are the foundation of a strong 21st century economy. The 
country that leads in basic scientific research obviously has a huge advantage in innova-
tion and technology. The country that can rely on domestically produced renewable 
energy isn’t exposed to the risks associated with relying on imports, keeps funds at home 
that would otherwise go abroad, and gets a leg up on what will be one of the most impor-
tant industries of this century. And the country that invests in its middle class produces 
educated, productive, and creative workers; a strong domestic market; a motivated work-
force; and a population from which the greatest innovators and entrepreneurs emerge. 
The investments we make include a doubling of spending on science, technology 
research, and renewable energy; large boosts in K-12 education, pre-K, and Pell grants; 
and a 20 percent hike in transportation and infrastructure spending.
Responsibly restraining discretionary spending 
The CAP plan includes separate spending limits on a unified security budget and on 
nonsecurity discretionary spending. Our unified security budget includes the distinct 
budgets of defense, homeland security, and international affairs—the budget areas that 
comprise the means by which we implement our national security policy. 
Beginning in 2016, we set the limit on the unified security budget at about $700 bil-
lion. This is approximately the same overall level, adjusted for inflation, as it was in 
1986 at the height of the Cold War. From there, the cap rises at the rate of inflation 
plus 1 percentage point. 
Our limits on nonsecurity discretionary spending are set at specific levels designed to 
adequately fund the public services on which the public and businesses rely, assum-
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ing they are provided more efficiently than in the past, and to make the investments 
described above. Overall, discretionary spending will make up about 6 percent of 
GDP in 2035, compared to 6.2 percent of GDP in the CBO baseline.
Shifting nonhealth mandatory spending
The CAP plan reduces agricultural subsidies and constrains the growth in many other 
programs while allowing room for investments and patching holes in the social safety 
net. The safety-net steps include increasing participation in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program to 85 percent of eligible people, increasing the Supplemental 
Security Income benefit, increasing housing assistance by 20 percent, and boosting 
funding for children’s programs. 
These steps plus our investments in education will reduce the poverty rate to below 
7 percent from its current level of over 14 percent. Preventing destitution is a moral 
obligation but pulling people off the economic sidelines into the mainstream serves 
national economic goals as well.
CAP has previously released a Social Security plan in our report, “Building It Up, Not 
Tearing It Down: A Progressive Approach to Strengthening Social Security,” which 
has a number of benefit adjustments that net to a reduction in outlays in 2030 from 
6.0 percent of GDP to 5.8 percent.2 
Containing health care cost growth
Rising costs and an aging population make health care a major driver of our long-
term deficits. Therefore, a key challenge in any deficit reduction plan is to lower 
these costs without sacrificing care for the millions of Americans who rely on public 
programs. Any approach that relies solely on savings from Medicare and other public 
programs without addressing rising health care costs economywide will only shift 
costs onto individuals and families, hurt the quality of care, or both. Co-pays will 
go up while providers leave the programs or make up lost revenue by raising private 
market rates on businesses and families.
To avoid that outcome, our plan brings down the costs of health care for everyone, not 
just those of the federal government. In this effort the Affordable Care Act, passed 
last year, is our most valuable tool. The new health care law has dozens of mecha-
nisms, reforms, and pilot programs designed to bring down the costs of care, while 
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improving the quality. The law also encourages the private sector to follow the public 
sector’s lead, and incentivizes public-private partnerships that bring down costs broadly. 
Backstopping all of this is the Independent Payment Advisory Board, whose mission it 
is to ensure that target savings are realized.
In our plan, aggressive implementation of the new health reform law, along with some 
enhancements to its existing cost-control mechanisms, will result in dramatically 
lower health expenditures, both for the federal government and overall. But predict-
ing the exact effect of the myriad test programs and reforms in the new health law is 
fraught with uncertainty. Thus we also include a failsafe mechanism that would ensure 
significant savings. 
Our failsafe would be triggered if, starting in 2020, total economywide health care 
expenditures grow at a rate faster than the economy. Should that happen then we would 
empower the Independent Payment Advisory Board to extend successful reforms 
in Medicare and other public programs to insurance plans offered in the health care 
exchanges and then potentially to all health care plans, such that the target is met. This 
will ensure that costs are constrained across the health care sector, preventing cost-shift-
ing and maintaining access for all.
The effect of these reforms, along with our failsafe, will be to hold federal health spend-
ing to 7.8 percent of GDP in 2035, compared to 9.8 percent in the CBO baseline. As 
importantly, they will lower the overall cost of health care thus ensuring that reductions 
in Medicare do not result in providers leaving the program and costs aren’t shifted from 
the public to the private sector.
Revenue
In the spending part of our plan we have constrained the areas of greatest growth, cut 
unneeded spending, and increased spending that is necessary to the future of our economy. 
Overall, our plan cuts spending by more than $13 trillion below current projections over 
the next 25 years. But even after all our spending cuts, without some revenue enhance-
ment, there would still be more spending than revenue. Compared to the CBO baseline 
we would still have a average deficit of 3.0 percent of GDP between 2017 and 2030. 
When the economy is running well and we are at peace, running deficits unnecessar-
ily weakens our nation. Thus, our plan raises additional revenue to balance the budget. 
It does so, however, in a way that simplifies a grotesquely complicated tax system. 
Our plan closes loopholes, eliminates special tax breaks that create unfair disparities 
among taxpayers, realigns the incentives of the tax system to better serve our econ-
introduction and summary | www.americanprogress.org 7
omy and planet, cuts income taxes for middle-income taxpayers, and takes steps to 
address the inequality that undermines our national prosperity.
Individual income tax
Our plan makes the individual income tax simpler and fairer. It introduces a flat 15 per-
cent rate for couples with incomes under $100,000.3 Many loopholes, deductions, and 
exemptions are eliminated, but the ones middle-class families most rely on are replaced 
by better-targeted credits. Thus, while taxpayers will no longer have the option of 
“deductions” from income such as for mortgage interest and charitable contributions, 
they will be able to instead receive a direct reduction in their taxes through a credit 
equal to 15 percent of these costs. 
In addition, there will be a large flat “alternative credit” that taxpayers can choose instead 
of the itemized credits. This alternative credit works similarly to the current standard 
deduction. For 90 percent of Americans, choosing the alternative credit instead of the 
itemized credits will both lower their overall tax bill, and make filing simple and easy. 
Most middle-class and lower-income taxpayers will pay lower income taxes under 
our proposal. These tax reductions will, on average, more than offset any higher taxes 
resulting from our new energy taxes described below. Tax rates are lower at most levels 
of taxable income. Overall, factoring in all the changes to the personal income tax in 
our plan, only those in the top 5 percent of the income spectrum will, on average, pay 
higher taxes. All other income groups, on average, will pay less or the same. 
For the wealthy, loopholes are closed and the top tax rate is restored to the level it 
was at under President Clinton during the 1990s economic expansion. A temporary 
surtax of 5 percent is added for ordinary income over $1 million. The surtax expires 
once the federal budget is balanced. The top rate will still be lower than during most 
of the postwar period, including the country’s greatest period of economic growth. 
The top tax rate for capital gains income (income from selling investments) is set at 
the level signed into law by President Reagan. The reforms make taxes simpler for 
the rich as well as the middle class by obviating the need for the alternative mini-
mum tax and various high-income phase-outs.
After years of successive tax cuts and rapidly increasing income (even as the income 
of typical Americans has stagnated or fallen) the wealthiest Americans can afford to 
pay more. Under our plan, the average after-tax income of the richest 1 percent of 
Americans will still be over 40 percent higher than it was in 2001. The richest 5 percent 
will still have over 30 percent higher income. 
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Finally, once our plan achieves budget surpluses in excess of 1 percent of GDP, the 
alternative credit is raised substantially to simplify tax filing for still more people and 
further reduce middle-income taxpayers’ tax bills—while maintaining a federal budget 
in balance or small surplus. This is projected to occur in 2033.
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reliance on foreign oil by pricing 
carbon pollution and levying an oil-import fee 
Our plan addresses the risks and economic damage from our heavy reliance on foreign 
oil and the dangers of climate change by establishing a price on emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and introducing an oil-import fee of $5 per barrel. 
Under our plan, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced by 42 percent of 2005 levels 
by 2030, and 83 percent of 2005 levels by 2050. For low- and middle-income taxpay-
ers, any resulting rises in energy prices are offset by the benefits of reduced income 
taxes. And, in the case of those who do not owe personal income tax, often the elderly, 
a rebate program accounted for in our spending proposals provides an offset.
Financial transactions tax 
Our plan imposes a modest fee on financial transactions, including trading in stocks, 
bonds, and derivatives. The tax is applied at a very low rate—less than two-tenths 
of a percent on stock trades. We believe the purpose of Wall Street is to raise capital 
for the productive sectors of the economy and that excessive financial speculation is 
counterproductive toward this purpose and harmful to stable growth in general. A 
financial transactions tax discourages unnecessary rapid turnaround speculation and 
improves incentives for long-term investment while raising revenue. Our proposal is 
modest compared to financial transactions taxes imposed in other financial centers, 
including the United Kingdom and Singapore.
Other revenue reforms
There are a number of other tax changes in the CAP plan. Among them:
•	 Remove the cap on the employer side of the payroll tax as described in the CAP Social 
Security plan. Currently the payroll tax to fund Social Security is only applied to 
earned income up to $106,800. Our proposal removes that cap but only on the part of 
the Social Security tax paid by the employer not the part paid by the employee.
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•	 Restore the estate tax to approximately pre-Bush tax-cut levels, but indexed for inflation. 
•	 Adopt several revenue proposals in President Obama’s 2011 and 2012 budgets. 
•	 Eliminate some industry-specific tax expenditures that are effectively government 
spending administered through the tax system, including those for the oil industry.
•	 Other revenue measures including an Internet gambling tax and Superfund excise tax.
Overall, our plan raises revenues in 2030 by less than 2 percent of GDP compared to 
the baseline. Total revenue drops to 23.8 percent of GDP by 2035, just half a percent-
age point above the baseline.
Conclusion
The plan described in this report will boost the economy and meet societal obligations 
while balancing the budget. It is also a realistic plan. That isn’t to say that it could pass 
Congress and be signed by a president today. No effective plan for long-term fiscal 
responsibility could at this point in the debate. That should not give us too much 
worry. There are many steps we can make now toward a responsible fiscal future with 
a strong economy and a healthy society. We have offered recommendations for such 
steps in other reports. Our goal in producing this vision for the long term is to offer a 
final destination that ensures our nation is as successful as it has ever been while fulfill-
ing all of its responsibilities. 
We believe our plan is not only a good one but also one that is not far off from where the 
country will go. In the end, the country will neither tolerate extreme spending cuts nor 
the most of dramatic tax increases. In the end, the country will seek a balance—and 
that is what we offer here—a combination of spending and revenue reforms to see our 
way to a balanced budget by 2030 and beyond.
In the pages that follow we will present in greater detail the spending and revenue 
reforms we outlined in this introduction and summary. As we’ll demonstrate, our 
plan is a fair, effective, and efficient way to restore our federal budget to balance by 
2030 while ensuring our nation remains the most competitive, innovative, and pros-
perous in the world. 
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The CAP plan for federal spending, 2012-2035
The plan reduces spending from about 27 percent of gross domestic product 
in 2030 according to the extended Congressional Budget Office baseline—
the official, nonpartisan projection of our fiscal future—to under 24 percent 
of GDP. By 2035 spending is down to about 23 percent of GDP. 
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Spending
The federal government makes investments that are important to our economy, 
provides services to the public, and carries out a variety of activities necessary to 
a well-functioning society. Our plan reduces government spending substantially 
relative to Congressional Budget Office projections, and puts a balanced budget 
within reach, but it does so without sacrificing the important role the federal 
government plays. 
There is no simple way to cut spending. Too much of government spending is 
necessary and, in fact, widely supported by the public. While some claim that the 
public strongly favors major cuts in spending—using that claim as the basis for 
taking a meat cleaver to the federal budget—the public’s views on public spend-
ing are much more nuanced than acknowledged. The vast majority of government 
spending is actually extremely popular. 
Twenty percent of all federal spending goes to Social Security, a 
program that enjoys the support of more than 87 percent of the 
population.4 Medicare and Medicaid are the next largest pro-
grams, together constituting 23 percent of the budget. Seventy-
eight percent of Americans oppose cuts to Medicare, and 69 
percent oppose cutting Medicaid.5 Defense spending is next on 
the list—and 56 percent of Americans said they didn’t want to 
cut that.6 That’s nearly two-thirds of the budget already. Add to 
that education, transportation, homeland security, and antipov-
erty efforts, all areas in which a majority of Americans oppose 
cuts, and there’s simply not much left that the American public 
doesn’t support.7 (see Figure 3)
There is no popular mandate for drastic spending cuts, but that 
does not mean there is widespread satisfaction with the way 
government uses taxpayer dollars. Getting the most out of our 
government and spending every dollar of taxpayers’ money 
Figure 3
Our federal government’s spending  
in 2010
Social Security
20%
Medicare and
Medicaid 
23%
Defense 
20%
Education,
transportation, 
antipoverty,
homeland security 
16%
All else 
15% 
Net interest
6%
Source: Office of Management and Budget.
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efficiently should be the absolute top priority for anyone who believes that gov-
ernment plays an important role in building a better, stronger nation. The truth is 
the federal government is capable of performing brilliantly, but it is also capable 
of performing abysmally; it can be guilty of “throwing dollars at problems,” and 
it can also be thoughtful, efficient, and successful. The government is capable of 
usurping roles best left to the private sector, but it can also hand off to the private-
sector functions that should remain public. Faced with limited resources, it is 
imperative that government get it right.
In short, there is much that we need for the federal government to do, there is 
much the public wants government to do, and we cannot shortchange those func-
tions. To be successful, to have the economy and society we want, we need to have 
a government that chooses its priorities well and makes the best possible use of 
the resources at its disposal.
In pursuit of this objective the Center for American Progress plan focuses on the 
following in bringing change to how the federal government spends its resources:
•	 Increasing investment that is essential for economic success. Other countries 
are ramping up their public investments and gaining on the United States in edu-
cation, scientific progress, technology, and other critical areas. We must increase 
our investments to maintain our leadership and sustain strong economic growth.
•	 Securing a strong middle class to drive American prosperity. The America we 
know was built by middle-class workers, innovators, entrepreneurs, and consum-
ers. Policies that support the middle class support a successful American economy.
•	 Bringing overall federal spending to levels consistent with a balanced bud-
get. Outside of periods of economic weakness or other national emergency the 
federal government should not run deficits. Areas of unsustainable spending 
growth, such as health care, must be brought under control. 
•	 Creating a more efficient federal government. We must transform government 
to make more efficient use of the resources it draws from the economy.
•	 Meeting public obligations. There are some national responsibilities that simply 
must be honored whatever their economic payoff: national security, public 
safety and health, preventing destitution, and honoring our commitments: 
including those to the elderly and disabled.
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•	 Bringing workers into the economic mainstream. Fighting poverty is good for 
the economy. Bringing people off the economic sidelines and into the main-
stream of American economic life benefits all of us. 
•	 Creating jobs and strengthening the economic recovery. Implementing overly 
aggressive deficit reduction before the economy fully recovers would be coun-
terproductive—stalling growth and worsening our fiscal problems.
Our plan will:
•	 Invest in education, transportation and infrastructure, science and technology, 
energy, and foundations for a strong middle class
•	 Aggressively pursue reforms in health care, both public and private
•	 Enhance the social safety net
•	 Establish a unified security budget, better designed to meet our 21st century 
security needs
•	 Modernize Social Security, and ensure its long-term solvency
•	 Seek out efficiencies all across government, cutting and reforming programs  
that don’t work as well as they should
Overall, our plan brings spending, as a share of GDP, down from its current, reces-
sion-driven level of about 25 percent to just under 22.5 percent by 2015. From 
there, spending begins to rise slowly again, as the retiring Baby Boom generation 
naturally pushes up spending in Social Security and Medicare, and as our plan 
begins to make new investments in economic development.
But due to cuts we propose in other areas and additional savings in the health care 
arena, spending rises much more slowly than under current projections. By 2025, 
spending in our plan peaks at 24.1 percent of GDP, compared to 25.5 percent in 
the Congressional Budget Office baseline in that year. After 2025, spending begins 
to drop again, as declining interest payments resulting from earlier deficit reduc-
tion begin to have a major effect. 
By 2035, federal spending will be 23.2 percent of GDP, a full 5 percentage points 
below CBO projections. All told, from 2012 to 2035, our plan cuts more than 
$13.5 trillion in spending compared to the baseline.
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Primary budget balance by 2015, major reforms thereafter
The timing of deficit reduction matters. In the short term, our nation’s most press-
ing concern is job creation and continued economic recovery. Therefore deficit 
reduction must be designed with that in mind. Secondly, achieving a balanced 
budget is going to require major, comprehensive reforms and it is going to take 
time before a consensus is reached on those reforms. There is a political journey 
our nation must travel first. 
With these principles in mind, our plan hits an intermediate target of primary 
balance in 2015, and starts a second phase of deficit reduction in 2017 aimed at 
achieving a fully balanced federal budget. Thus, our plan doesn’t choke off eco-
nomic recovery, and it allows time to build support for the types of changes that 
are needed to achieve full balance. 
Our 2015 plan includes spending cuts to the Department of Defense and to 
agriculture subsidies as well as smaller reductions in a number of other manda-
tory programs and to nondefense discretionary programs, with some adjustments 
in mandatory health care programs. This plan is detailed in our report “The First 
Step: A Progressive Plan for Meaningful Deficit Reduction by 2015.”8 In the sections 
below we describe our spending proposals that carry forward these changes and 
expand on them, mostly starting in 2017.
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Investing to promote economic growth
There are many things that can be done to promote economic growth and 
strengthen the middle class, but among the most important is public investment. 
There is broad consensus that overall investment levels are a key driver of future 
economic growth and prosperity. Center for American Progress economists 
Adam Hersh and Christian Weller, for example, recently demonstrated the “clear 
causal relationship” between investment and higher productivity.9 And high pro-
ductivity growth is essential to higher standards of living.10 
It’s no wonder then that countries with greater investments in both physical and 
human capital tend to have higher income levels.11 (see Figure 4) Unfortunately, 
overall U.S. net investment is currently at its lowest levels since World War II.12
Certainly the lion’s share of investment comes 
from the private sector, but public investment 
plays an important role as well.13 There are some 
areas where, if left to itself, the private market 
would vastly underinvest, making us all worse 
off. Some investments, for example, can be 
thought of as “public goods” that are important 
to the economy but from which no profit can 
be gained because the benefits are such that no 
one can be excluded from them, and one person 
enjoying those benefits does not preclude oth-
ers from doing the same. For instance, national 
defense, fire departments, flood control, and 
transportation safety are public goods.
The private market will chronically underinvest 
in public goods, because there is no easy way 
to make consumers pay for the benefits they 
derive. We rely on the government to invest in 
them because no one else would.
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Investment leads to growth
Investment as a share of GDP and average GDP growth, 2007-2010, 
among world growth leaders
Source: Adam Hersh and Sarah Ayres, “Investment Alternatives: Comparing What Budget Plans Mean for Our 
Economic Future,” Center for American Progress, February 25, 2011, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2011/02/investment_alternatives.html
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Public money is also crucial to support investments that create what economists 
call “positive externalities.” A positive externality results when a particular invest-
ment confers benefits on the broader community as well as the person who paid 
for it. Investment in education is a good example. Getting a quality education is 
good for the student, of course, but having an educated population is also good 
for businesses, and for civic society. 
In short, the better our school system is, the better off we all are—even if we are no 
longer in school ourselves. Because of this “positive externality” the private market 
would undervalue education, and therefore provide less of it than 
we’d ideally want. That’s where public investment comes in.
Finally, it’s worth noting that in some areas public investment 
can actually induce the private sector to increase its own invest-
ments. A 2003 study of 17 economically developed countries, 
for example, found that for every dollar of public investment in 
research and development, private firms were induced to spend 
about 70 cents of their own money as the government invest-
ments opened up opportunities.14 Privately funded research, in 
turn, drives innovation and has spillover benefits throughout 
the economy.
Basic science and technology research, infrastructure, education, 
energy—these are the kinds of areas where public investment is 
absolutely critical and can pay dramatic dividends. 
Science and technology
Public investment in research and development is a key driver 
in technological innovation and productivity growth. An 
assessment of the Group of 7 leading developed economies 
between 1971 and 1990 showed that for every $1 of R&D 
investment, GDP increased by $1.23.15 Similarly, one study 
published in the American Economic Review in 2002 estimates 
that nearly 50 percent of U.S. economic growth between 1950 
and 1993 could be attributed to the impact of investment in 
research and development.16 Clearly, the country that wants to 
grow will invest heavily in scientific research.
Figure 5
Numerically challenged
Student performance, among 15-year-olds, 
in mathematics in 2009 compared to other 
developed nations in the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development
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Which is what the United States once did. But U.S. investment in basic science 
is down across the board. Since the 1960s, federal support for basic science has 
been shrinking.17 Corporate investment in this area has been falling, too.18 At 
the same time, other countries are increasing their commitments. As a result the 
United States has fallen to 22nd among the developed country member nations 
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development in total invest-
ment in nondefense research and development, as a share of the economy.19
Under our plan, investment in R&D would no longer take a back seat. We double, 
in real terms, the federal investment in basic science and technology research. 
Education
Few would deny the benefits of a highly educated, highly skilled workforce. 
Both common sense and a deep body of research lead us to the inescapable 
conclusion that a quality education system yields enormous dividends while 
weaknesses in our system result in enormous losses. One recent report found 
that if schools in states with lower-than-average performance were brought up 
just to the national average, the economy would enjoy a $700 billion boost.20
Sadly, we know that America’s school system is falling behind. There are any num-
ber of statistics one could cite to show how dramatic the needs are. Suffice it to 
say that one estimate put the economic cost of the gap between U.S. educational 
achievement and international achievement at anywhere between $1.3 trillion 
and $2.3 trillion a year.21 Without a quality education system, the United States 
cannot hope to compete in the 21st century. (see Figure 5) 
Our plan addresses this need in three ways. First, we double federal funding for 
pre-kindergarten. Research consistently shows that investments in early education 
yield great returns. The HighScope Perry Preschool study documented a return 
to society of more than $16 for every tax dollar invested in early childcare and 
development. At age 40, children who participated in this high-quality preschool 
program had higher earnings, were more likely to hold a job, had committed fewer 
crimes, and were more likely to have graduated from high school.22
Second, over the span of 20 years, we gradually increase the federal contribu-
tion to total K through 12th grade funding from about 6.5 percent in 2007 to 
about 12 percent by 2035. Overall, our plan would increase total spending on 
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education—federal, state, and local—by about 5.5 
percent. Though state and local governments are 
the primary source of funding for K through 12th 
grade education, the federal government plays an 
important role in helping to alleviate inequities 
in the provision of educational resources within 
districts, between districts, and between states. 
Despite current federal investment via programs 
targeted at resolving these inequities, such as Title 
I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
they still persist. 
This same K through 12 funding increase also is 
critical to close achievement gaps between groups 
of students defined by race and ethnicity and family 
income. As our population continues to become 
more diverse and as income inequality continues 
to increase, the federal government needs to play 
a larger role in funding schools so that all children 
have the resources they need to achieve high stan-
dards. In addition, federal spending can play a criti-
cal role in encouraging local school districts to adopt 
best practices for improving the quality of education. 
Third, we boost federal Pell grants and other higher 
education grants by about one quarter. Currently, 
less than 40 percent of American adults have some 
level of postsecondary education, and yet, by 2018, 
more than 60 percent of all jobs in the United 
States will require at least some college education. 
Worse, the percentage of American adults with a 
postsecondary education has been flat while most other developed countries 
have enjoyed large gains. (see Figure 6) To meet the demands of the labor mar-
ket and keep America competitive in the global economy, we need to ensure that 
more people pursue postsecondary education—and that more people finish. 
Our increased investment in higher education recognizes that any significant 
change in postsecondary attainment will require more participation by low-
income, first-generation students as well as the development of innovative 
Figure 6
Postsecondary achievement in the United States  
is stagnant
Percentage, by age group, who have attained a postsecondary 
education among developed countries
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Education at a Glance 2009: 
OECD Indicators, September 2009
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approaches to delivering flexible, cost-effective education services. We estimate 
that our proposed increase will be sufficient to achieve the goal of 60 percent 
of American adults with some level of postsecondary education.
Energy
If the United States is still relying nearly exclusively on fossil fuels by the middle 
of this century then we will have lost the clean energy race and ceded leadership 
to other countries. What’s worse, if we fail to invest in alternative and renewable 
energy we will—as the world’s second-largest producer of the greenhouses gases 
that lead to global warming—also be seriously fouling our planet. The good news, 
however, is that we can avoid that fate by investing now in clean energy. These 
investments will ensure we are competitive in these technologies and are starting 
to create new jobs. In fact, dollars invested in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy technologies result in between two and a half times and four times as many 
jobs as dollars spent in the oil and gas industry.23
Of course, if we want those jobs and if we want to compete with other countries, we 
have some catching up to do. Right now, the United States ranks 11th among the 
Group of 20 leading developed and developing countries in “clean energy invest-
ment intensity,” measured as clean energy investments per unit of GDP.24 
Besides the clear economic and environmental benefits, there are several other 
compelling reasons to invest in clean energy. National security, for one. You 
would be hard pressed to find anyone who thinks it is a good idea to rely on for-
eign countries, some of whom are unstable, while others are outright hostile, for 
our energy needs. And economic security for another. The United States imports 
huge amounts of foreign oil every year, which greatly contributes to our trade 
deficit and drains dollars out of the U.S. economy. Becoming a leader in renew-
able and alternative energy technologies could reverse that flow.
The Center for American Progress plan includes a real doubling of federal invest-
ments in clean energy technology research and deployment. These investments 
will transform America’s energy mix, resulting in a clean energy portfolio that will 
help prevent the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. They will also make 
the United States a global leader in new, clean energy technologies.
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Transportation and infrastructure
A robust, efficient, modern transportation network is crucial. Without it the 
movement of goods and services across the country is significantly harder, rais-
ing costs for consumers and cutting into businesses’ profit margins. No wonder, 
then, that the Congressional Budget Office reports that investments in infrastruc-
ture are one of the best ways to promote long-term economic and employment 
growth.25 But the benefits from investments in transportation and infrastructure 
go beyond a boost to overall growth—these investments also result in solid, 
middle-class jobs.26
Despite the clear advantages of modern, well-maintained infrastructure, the 
United States has chronically underinvested in this area for decades. Since 
the beginning of the Reagan administration, the federal contribution to infra-
structure investment as a share of the economy has been declining, and is now 
close to half what it was in 1980. And the private sector has not filled the gap 
with overall investment in infrastructure, public and private combined, on 
the decline.27 The upshot: The United States in 2009 ranked 23rd in a World 
Economic Forum ranking of global infrastruc-
ture quality, down from 7th in 1999.28 
The consequences are readily apparent 
across our landscape. The Federal Highway 
Administration reports that approximately 
147,000 of the 605,000 bridges in America are 
failing,29 and 18 percent of our roadways are 
deemed in poor condition.30
To reverse these trends, our plan includes a 
20 percent increase to the level of gross federal 
investment in transportation and infrastructure, 
adjusted for inflation, with the objective of fully 
meeting the projected capacity demands for 
modern, efficient infrastructure systems.
Figure 7
Federal funding for transportation is going downhill
Federal spending on transportation, as a share of GDP, 1980-2008
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Investments in the middle class
Our investment strategy extends to investments in people: the people that com-
prise the vast American middle class and those who aspire to join it. One of the 
great advantages our nation has possessed in global economic competition has 
been the strength of our middle class. 
That strength has given a mass of Americans the freedom to become educated 
workers who have the training to be highly productive and creative. It has meant 
a body of consumers with the collective buying power to set worldwide trends, 
benefiting the businesses that best know American tastes and the American mar-
ket. These consumers have also formed the backbone of sustenance to American 
industry producing for the American market—a stability in consumption that in 
turn has prompted massive private investment. 
A strong middle class has also meant a group of people with the security to take 
risks—entrepreneurs and innovators who can risk leaving their jobs to start a 
company or pursue an invention, having built a modest foundation of middle-
class wealth to make the leap of faith that time and again has transformed our 
economy. The opportunity of succeeding in the middle class—to build a busi-
ness, to get promoted, to have a better life—has motivated Americans since our 
founding. Opportunity comes from a strong 
economy, but a strong economy also comes 
from motivated workers seeking the bounty 
that opportunity offers. 
Investing in the middle class is important for 
another reason: The middle class invests in 
America. Middle-class people don’t short-
change their children’s education. They don’t 
move jobs overseas. And they don’t invest the 
nation’s wealth in foolish doomed financial 
instruments or engage in elaborate tax evasion 
schemes. What’s more, research the world over 
demonstrates that countries with strong mid-
dle classes are countries that make the types of 
investments we propose in our plan—because 
people in the middle class know that their fate 
is tied to the fate of their nation.
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Investing in growth and prosperity
Federal spending on critical investments—education, transportation, 
energy, science—under CAP plan, as a share of GDP, 2016-2035
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CBO methodology.
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But, more and more, the deck is being stacked 
against the middle class and the opportuni-
ties to rise into the middle class are becoming 
fewer. Our plan works to restore the balance. 
Many of the investments described above 
will help restore middle-class opportunity. 
Education is the obvious example, but the 
middle class also benefits from the jobs and 
opportunities made available from a variety 
of investments, and benefits the most from 
having scientific advancements and innovation 
happen here in the United States. 
Furthermore, Medicare, Social Security, 
unemployment compensation, and other 
social insurance, as well as health and public 
safety programs, are part of a body of public 
protections that enable middle-class families 
to live their lives with an eye on what it will take for them to succeed instead of 
a constant worry about what dangers lie ahead in their path. 
Yet, these are precisely the types of investments and services that have come under 
assault recently. We believe that, instead, the precise opposite course is best for the 
country, the economy, and all Americans.
The bottom line on investments and nonsecurity  
discretionary spending
Nearly all of these investments, with the exception of social insurance programs, 
fall into the category of spending in the federal budget called “nonsecurity discre-
tionary.”31 In addition to these investments, this category contains almost all the 
basic domestic functions of the federal government, such as patents, regulatory 
agencies, and veterans’ services.
All together, nonsecurity discretionary spending in our plan would rise from 
about 2.8 percent of GDP in 2016—before our major new investments begin—to 
about 3 percent of GDP in 2017. From there, nonsecurity discretionary spending 
would peak at 3.1 percent of GDP in 2020, and slowly decline until 2035, at which 
point it will be down to the same level where it began in 2016. (see Figure 9)
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Controlling nonsecurity discretionary spending
Total nonsecurity discretionary spending, as a share of GDP,  
under CAP plan, 2012-2035
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CBO methodology.
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Containing the growth 
of health care costs
Federal government spending on health care is a major contributor to our nation’s 
long-term budget deficits. The Congressional Budget Office projects that total 
federal spending on health care will rise from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2010 to just 
under 10 percent of GDP by 2035, an increase of nearly 4.5 percentage points. All 
other federal noninterest spending is actually projected to decline slightly over 
that same time period. One reason for the projected increase in federal health care 
spending is simple demographics: Our population is getting older. (see Figure 10)
Blame it on the Baby Boomers. This year about 13 percent of the population 
is 65 years old or over, but by 2030 that percentage is expected to rise to nearly 
20 percent. Of course, the aging of the population puts enormous pressure on 
programs designed to serve older Americans, such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Medicare, our national health program for 
senior citizens, is effective, efficient, and 
popular. Because of Medicare, nearly every 
single American over the age of 65 is guaran-
teed health coverage, and public opinion polls 
consistently show that the American people 
want to protect it. And despite the fact that the 
Medicare population, by its nature, costs more 
to care for than younger, healthier people, cost 
growth in the public program is nevertheless 
far lower than in the private sector.32
Medicaid, though often thought of as a 
health program for the poor, will also feel the 
effects of an aging population. This is because 
Medicaid is the nation’s safety net supporting 
long-term care. Although older people account 
for only one-tenth of Medicaid enrollees, they 
Figure 10
Going gray
Percent of U.S. population over the age of 65, 2010-2035
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account for one-quarter of Medicaid spending. One-third of Medicaid dollars 
are spent on long-term care for the elderly and disabled. Furthermore, Medicaid 
pays for about half of all nursing home care. Nearly all nursing home residents 
are elderly, and many, if not most, of the beneficiaries of this care lived their 
whole lives in the middle class. Long-term care is, however, expensive, which 
means many elderly will deplete their own assets and end up relying on Medicaid.
But the aging of our population is only part of the story. In fact, the larger reason 
for the rising cost of public health programs is that health care costs are on the 
rise generally—in both the private and public sectors. The United States has 
the most expensive health care in the world. According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, we spend nearly twice as much on health care, per capita, as the 
average developed country.33 (see Figure 11) 
The best of American health care is, arguably, the best in the world, yet spending 
more than anyone else does not result in overall better health outcomes in the 
United States. In fact, our national health is no better than many other developed 
countries, and by some measures is actually worse. Two telling examples: The 
United States has below-average life expectancy 
and above-average infant mortality rates.34 
Given that health care in the United States is 
expensive for everyone, it is not surprising 
that it’s expensive for our government, too. 
This makes addressing government health care 
costs complicated. This isn’t a matter of simply 
redesigning a federal spending program to 
be more efficient or stopping out-of-control 
expansion. Any serious solution has to address 
the growth of costs in the private sector as 
well. Otherwise, the consequences for those 
who rely on public programs would be dev-
astating. Why? Because if spending on those 
public programs is limited while private-sector 
costs continue to balloon, some combination 
of three things will happen: 
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Big spender
The United States ranked first among developed nations in 
combined public and private health care spending, 2008
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation.
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1. Out-of-pocket costs for the elderly will grow. That is, the difference between what 
the public insurance programs pay and what the services cost will widen, leaving 
the elderly, most of whom are on fixed incomes, facing enormous financial strains.
2. Access to care and the quality of that care will decline. Better doctors and hospitals 
will cater to the higher-paying private market and avoid treating those who receive 
their coverage from the public sector—namely the elderly, disabled, and poor.
3. Costs will shift from the public to the private sector. As doctors and hospitals 
get squeezed by government program cuts they’ll raise prices for everyone else.
None of these options is particularly attractive. 
Our approach—lower costs for everyone, not just in the  
public programs
To avoid any of these outcomes while simultaneously holding down federal spend-
ing on public health programs, our plan is focused on efforts to bring down the costs 
of health care for everyone, not just those of the federal government. This approach 
has benefits not just for the federal bottom line but also for the nation’s businesses 
and families who every year bear the burden of rising health costs.
In this effort, the recently passed Affordable Care Act is our most valuable 
tool. The new health law contains dozens of mechanisms, reforms, and pilot 
programs designed to bring down the costs of health care while improving the 
quality of that care. The law also encourages the private sector to follow the 
public sector’s lead, and explicitly encourages public-private partnerships that 
successfully bring down costs broadly. 
Backstopping all of this is the newly created Independent Payment Advisory 
Board, whose mission is to ensure that target savings are realized. The IPAB will 
offer binding changes to Medicare if spending, per beneficiary, grows faster than 
expected. Congress can overrule the IPAB, but if it does nothing the reforms are 
automatically implemented. 
The Congressional Budget Office projects that the Affordable Care Act will 
reduce the federal budget deficit by $230 billion over the next 10 years, and we 
are confident that aggressive implementation of the law can yield even more 
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savings. But there are some particular enhancements and policy changes that 
could be made in the near term to both strengthen the new health law and 
immediately reduce costs further. 
First, the Affordable Care Act currently exempts certain health care providers—
most significantly hospitals—from any actions taken by the IPAB. Extending the 
new board’s authority to all health care providers would ensure that all sectors 
achieve the efficiencies that are at the heart of effective cost containment. 
Second, adding a public health insurance option to the new health care exchanges 
that will be up and running in 2014 would create competition in insurance markets, 
serve as a model for payment innovation, and put pressure on private plans to 
bring their costs down. Consumers purchasing health insurance in the health care 
exchanges could buy into a public option if they choose, or opt for private health 
insurance plans. Payment rates by the public health insurance plan to health care 
providers will not be tied to Medicare’s payment rates in our plan, making it a 
so-called “weak” public option. Instead, the public insurance plan would negotiate 
with health care providers in the same manner as private-sector plans.
 Third, our plan requires that health insurance exchanges act not simply as 
clearinghouses but as “active purchasers,” a health-policy term for exchanges that 
set standards. This means they have the power to hold participating insurance 
plans accountable for keeping premiums down and quality up—through bidding 
processes, exclusion of poor performers, or other mechanisms. Without being 
“active purchasers,” the exchanges could end up with an overwhelming number of 
options for insurance, with no simple way for consumers to distinguish between 
efficient, low-cost, quality plans and bottom-of-the-barrel plans. 
In addition to our enhancements of several elements in the new health law 
described above, the Center for American Progress plan also would implement 
some money-saving policies designed to reduce federal health spending by about 
$230 billion over the next 10 years. These include:
•	 A Medicare rebate program, requiring Medicare to negotiate reduced pharma-
ceutical prices as is already required of Medicaid
•	 Reduced graduate medical education payments to tie Medicare payments to 
hospitals with teaching programs more closely aligned to actual training costs
•	 Enhanced home health savings to accelerate payment reforms already required 
by the Affordable Care Act
•	 Additional health care savings identified in President Obama’s 2012 budget35
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Taken together, these savings are enough to approximately offset the cost of 
implementing a permanent fix of the sustainable growth rate formula, which, if left 
unattended, requires automatic massive cuts to Medicare payment rates for doc-
tors, which are unacceptable both politically and substantively. 
We believe that aggressive implementation of the Affordable Care Act alongside 
enhancements to its existing cost-control mechanisms will result in dramatically 
lower health care expenditures, both for the federal government and overall. But 
we also recognize that predicting the specific effect of the myriad test programs 
and reforms in the new health law is fraught with uncertainty. That’s why our plan 
also includes a failsafe mechanism that would ensure significant savings through-
out the system.
Our failsafe would be triggered if, starting in 2020, total health care expendi-
tures—not just those in the public sector—grow at a rate faster than that of 
the economy itself. Should that happen, we would empower the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board—subject to the same 
congressional review process as exists currently 
in the health care law—to extend successful 
reforms in the public sector to all insurance 
plans offered in the health care exchanges, and 
then potentially to all health care plans, such 
that the target is met. 
The bottom line on health care
The effect of these reforms, along with our 
failsafe, will be to hold federal health spending 
to 7.8 percent of GDP in 2035, compared to 
9.8 percent in the CBO baseline. As impor-
tantly, they will lower the overall cost of health 
care thus ensuring that reductions in Medicare 
do not result in providers leaving the program 
and that costs aren’t shifted from the public to 
the private sector. (see Figure 12)
Figure 12
Bending the health care cost curve
Federal health care spending, as a share of GDP, under CBO 
baseline and CAP plan, 2012-2035
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Lifting millions out of poverty  
into the middle class
Poverty is a blight and burden, not just for those directly affected but also for  
society as a whole. Of course, working to lift people out of poverty is a moral 
obligation, but it is an economic imperative as well. Taking people off the sidelines 
of the economy and getting them working, producing, and consuming as part of 
the middle class is an unadulterated good for everyone. Right now, more than 
40 million Americans, including nearly 16 million children, live below the federal 
poverty line—about $22,000 a year for a family of four. This is remarkably high 
compared to other economically advanced countries—the United States ranks 
24th out of 25 developed countries in terms of overall poverty rates.36 The societal 
and economic costs associated with these levels of poverty are simply enormous.
In 2007, a team of economists led by Dr. Harry Holzer of Georgetown University 
issued a report detailing the economic consequences of child poverty alone. They 
found that child poverty costs the U.S. economy about 4 percent of GDP per year 
in lost adult productivity and wages, increased 
crime, and higher health expenditures.37 That 
would translate into about $600 billion this 
year. Holzer’s conclusions mesh with a wide 
array of other academic studies, confirming the 
Government Accountability Office’s conclusion 
that there is “a negative association between pov-
erty and economic growth consistent with theo-
retical literature’s conclusion that higher rates of 
poverty can result in lower rates of growth.”38 
Clearly, we would do well to focus our efforts 
a bit more on cutting down on the numbers of 
people, especially children, living in poverty. 
Fortunately, we know from history that with a 
concerted effort and with appropriate policy 
changes, we can dramatically lower poverty. In 
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Figure 13
Antipoverty efforts can succeed
The falling poverty rate among Americans age 65 and over,  
1959-2009
Source: US Census Bureau.
Note: The Census Bureau does not have data for senior citizen poverty between 1960-1966. The dotted line is a 
simple straight line interpolation between the 1959 level and the 1967 level.
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1960, for example, about one in every three senior citizens lived in poverty. Partly 
in response to that dramatic statistic, the federal government expanded Social 
Security, and instituted the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Today, poverty 
among senior citizens is less than 10 percent. (see Figure 13)
Our plan to cut poverty in half
In 2007, the Center for American Progress Task Force on Poverty issued recom-
mendations for a comprehensive plan to cut poverty in half by 2030.39 We largely 
follow its lead. We target our efforts at people for whom interventions will have 
the largest effects, especially children and the disabled. Our plan:
•	 Increases participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to 
85 percent of eligible households from about two-thirds currently 
•	 Raises the monthly Supplemental Security Income benefit at least to the 
poverty level
•	 Improves child nutrition programs
•	 Increases federal support for affordable housing by 20 percent
•	 Maintains the newly enhanced earned income tax credit, and further boosts the 
child tax credit (see page 43-44 for more information)
The bottom line on antipoverty efforts
These changes, in conjunction with our new investments in 
education and our proposed changes to Social Security (see 
page 33) will result in approximately 20 million fewer people 
in poverty by 2030, dropping the rate down to under 7 per-
cent. These programs are already enormously successful at 
keeping people out of poverty and putting them on the path 
to the middle class. A recent report from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research concludes, “the benefit system in 
the United States has a major impact on poverty rates.”40 By 
improving the system and extending it to more of the popula-
tion who needs it, we can achieve the goal of cutting poverty in 
half. (see Figure 14)
Figure 14
Cutting poverty in half
U.S. poverty rate in 2009 and in 2030 under the 
CAP plan
Source: US Census Bureau and authors’ calculations.
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Budgeting for national security  
in the 21st century
Budgeting for the security of our country presents two major challenges. First, 
the traditional way that Congress allocates money to national security agencies is 
outdated. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked, “It has become 
clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been 
chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long, relative to what we 
spend on the military.” Just last year, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed Secretary Gates’s point:
It’s time to invest in other departments, such as homeland security, intelligence 
and the State Department, whose budget pales compared to massive Pentagon 
funding. My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this 
regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent 
upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands and 
not enough on the State Department.41 
A big reason why this imbalance exists between 
the various elements of our national security 
strategy—defense, homeland security, and 
diplomacy—is because these elements are 
funded in separate categories.42 Without a uni-
fied security budget, policymakers are less able 
to judge the real trade-offs between the compo-
nents of a comprehensive security strategy.
The second challenge is dealing with skyrock-
eting spending in the Pentagon. Of course, 
the cost of prosecuting the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are enormous, but even after the 
expected drawdown in troops in those two con-
flicts, defense spending is expected to remain 
higher, in real terms, than at any point since 
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Figure 15
Defense spending at record highs
U.S. defense spending in billions of constant dollars, 1975-2010
Source: Office of Management and Budget.
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World War II. In other words, even after the conclusion of the wars, we will still be 
spending far more on defense than we did at the height of the Cold War buildup. 
(see Figure 15)
The Center for American Progress plan would address both of these problems 
by creating a unified security budget while implementing reasonable, achievable 
cuts to the Pentagon. Our unified security budget incorporates the traditional 
defense budget, the State Department budget, and the Department of Homeland 
Security budget.
The cuts we have identified come from a recent Center for American Progress 
report by Lawrence Korb and Laura Conley entitled, “Strong and Sustainable,” 
which describes about $110 billion in cuts to the Defense Department.43 Our 
plan adopts these savings. We believe this would bring total security spending to 
a reasonable and sustainable level, with sufficient resources available to keep the 
country safe. (see Figure 16)
Figure 16
Recommended defense program cuts and estimated savings in FY2015
Defense programs “Strong and Sustainable” savings
Total 109.1
Redirect the majority of overhead efficiency savings to reduce the baseline defense budget 25.0
Roll back growth in the Army and Marine Corps 12.1
Permanently reduce the number of non-Iraq/non-Afghanistan overseas personnel 12.0
Reduce nuclear forces 11.4
Adopt across-the-board reduction in research, development, test, and evaluation funding 10.0
Reduce civilian DOD personnel in line with a decrease in military end strength 8.0
Adopt the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care 6.0
Reform the military pay system in accordance with the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 5.5
Reduce Joint Strike Fighter procurement by 50 percent 4.8
Retire two carrier battle groups and associated air wings 3.0
Limit procurement of the Virginia-Class Submarine 2.8
Cancel the V-22 Osprey 1.9
Limit procurement of the DDG-51 Destroyer 1.9
Cancel CVN-80 funding 1.5
Reduce procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship 1.3
Cancel select missile defense programs 1.3
Cancel the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 0.6
Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.
32 center for American progress | Budgeting for Growth and prosperity
The bottom line on security
After implementing the cuts, and incorporat-
ing the unified security budget, total security 
spending will be about $700 billion in 2016. 
From there, our plan limits the rate of security 
spending growth to the rate of inflation plus 
1 percentage point. Our plan recognizes the 
need for our total national security spending 
to post real growth each year given our global 
obligations and the continuing threats to our 
homeland. Because of this real growth, by 
2030, total security spending will be approxi-
mately the same, in inflation adjusted terms, as 
prereduction-level spending. (see Figure 17) 
As a share of GDP, however, security spending 
will be lower than in 2016 thus will contribute 
to deficit reduction.
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Figure 17
Lean and mean
U.S. security spending in billions of constant 2010 dollars under 
the CAP plan, 2012-2035
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Modernizing Social Security and 
ensuring its 75-year solvency
Social Security is not a major contributor to the federal budget deficit. Every year 
up until the onset of the Great Recession in 2007, Social Security revenues were 
more than enough to cover its costs. But over the next several decades, as the Baby 
Boom generation retires, a gap is projected to open up between Social Security 
income and costs. If left unattended, this will cause the Social Security Trust Fund 
to eventually run out, which would necessitate a large reduction in benefits. 
In our report, “Building it Up, Not Tearing it Down,” the Center for American 
Progress presented a detailed plan to close the shortfall and at the same time 
modernize the program to address some existing problems. The major elements 
of the plan:
•	 Improve benefits for the very old, the very poor, and surviving family members
•	 Expand spousal benefits to married same-sex couples
•	 Gradually phase in progressive changes to the benefit formula that would lower 
benefits at higher incomes
•	 Remove the Social Security payroll cap on the employer side of the payroll tax
•	 Invest a portion of the Social Security trust fund in the stock market44
The bottom line on Social Security
The effect of our reforms is to bring Social Security into 75-year actuarial balance. 
In terms of spending, these reforms will mean a net reduction in Social Security 
outlays in 2030 of about 0.2 percent of GDP, compared to the CBO baseline. 
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Doing what works
Given the enormous needs of our country—for more investment, for building a 
strong middle class, for sustainable national security, for honoring our obligations 
to senior citizens, for reducing poverty—we simply cannot afford to spend money 
on programs that do not meet those needs, or on those that just don’t work well. 
“Because that’s the way it’s always been done,” is not a good reason to keep doing 
something. In an age of tight budgets, we must have a relentless focus on improv-
ing government efficiency, calibrating every program so dollars are spent wisely.
Federal agriculture subsidies are an excellent example of a program that is out-
dated, expensive, and inefficient. A recent report from the Center for American 
Progress details how these subsidies are both unnecessary and unfair.45 Most 
recipients are extremely wealthy farm conglomerates. Nearly two-thirds of all 
payments go to the largest 12 percent of all farms. It is time to reduce and reform 
these subsidies, and our plan cuts spending on them in half.
There are also dozens of inefficient or just plain ridiculous spending programs that 
operate through the individual and corporate income tax codes. These provisions, 
often called “tax expenditures,” are exactly the same, economically speaking, as 
traditional spending programs, but they garner far less scrutiny. Many tax expen-
ditures benefit an extremely narrow set of individuals or companies, and very few 
have undergone rigorous evaluation to determine if they actually achieve their 
goals (if they even have any goals). Our plan scours the code and eliminates doz-
ens of these kinds of “tax entitlements,” including, for example, special subsidies 
that go to the oil and gas industry. See Appendix 3 on page 61 for a complete list 
of tax expenditures that we remove or reform.
Another good example of “business as usual” that calls out for reform is the way 
in which most government benefit programs are adjusted for inflation. Of course 
it makes sense to adjust benefit amounts to account for a rise in consumer prices, 
but right now, the measure the government uses to make these adjustments 
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overstates the effect of inflation. As a result, these benefits actually increase in real 
terms each year. Changing to a more accurate measure of inflation, as our plan 
does across the entire government (including the tax code), would save a signifi-
cant amount of money compared to continuing to use the existing measure.
These are some specific reforms that our plan explicitly includes, but we also 
implicitly expect much greater savings deriving from a targeted, committed effort 
to improve government efficiency across the board. Every year, the government 
sends out more than $100 billion in improper payments. Reining in no-bid con-
tracts, promoting competition among contractors, and improving transparency in 
the contracting system could save $40 billion a year.46 Consolidating and modern-
izing information technology could save another $16 billion a year.47 
The bottom line on government efficiency
There is no way to calculate the exact magnitude of savings possible from improv-
ing the way government does business on a daily basis. Because of that, we do not 
rely on those kinds of prospective savings—aside from those that derive from spe-
cific program changes—to achieve a balanced budget. But we do expect that sav-
ings of this nature will allow the effective spending reductions our plan dictates in 
certain areas to be accomplished without sacrifices in the quality of public services.
The CAP plan for federal revenue, 2012-2035
Overall, our plan raises revenues in 2030 by less than 2 percent of GDP 
compared to the Congressional Budget Office baseline. Total revenue  
drops to 23.8 percent of GDP by 2035, just half a percentage point above  
the CBO baseline.
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Revenue
Our revenue plan raises adequate revenue, realigns the incentives of the tax system 
to better serve our economy, simplifies a grotesquely complicated individual 
income tax, and takes steps to address the unfairness in the tax system that under-
mines our national prosperity. In short, our plan raises sufficient revenue more 
fairly and more efficiently while making tax filing simpler.
There is no responsible way to balance the budget without raising more revenue. 
In the spending part of our plan we have constrained spending in the areas of 
greatest growth, cut unneeded spending, and put in place spending increases that 
are necessary to the future of our economy. Overall, our plan cuts spending to 
more than $13 trillion below current projec-
tions for the next 25 years. 
But even with these major spending cuts we are 
still left with more spending than the revenue 
projected in the CBO baseline. The deficits 
under this scenario would be under 3.5 percent 
of GDP from 2014, which is arguably out of 
the deficit danger zone that brings the fear of 
extreme market reaction to the hearts of many 
economists and investors. But some of the 
assumptions underpinning the Congressional 
Budget Office baseline are probably unrealis-
tic. For instance, it assumes none of the Bush 
tax cuts are extended, and that the alternative 
minimum tax is allowed to raise more and more 
revenue from the middle class. This suggests 
the need for increased revenue, as our plan 
details. (see Figure 18)
Figure 18
Revenue falls short even with major spending cuts
The CAP plan for spending compared to the Congressional Budget 
Office baselines, 2012-2035 
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Moreover, even if one accepts the CBO 
baseline estimate as an accurate prediction 
of future revenues, outside of moments of 
national crisis or special need there is no rea-
son to be running deficits at any level. During 
times of strong economic growth even small 
deficits can have a small negative effect on the 
economy. Deficits also mean added debt. And 
added debt means future interest payments 
that take away from better uses for taxpayer 
dollars. Added debt also means that a country 
is not as well positioned going into a period of 
crisis than it would be otherwise. 
Balanced budgets or surpluses during times of 
peace and economic calm are how we can pay 
down the debt accumulated during times of 
special need so that the country is in a stronger position to confront unforeseen 
challenges. President Clinton recognized these things and the United States ran 
surpluses from 1998 through 2001—thus paying off significant debt accumulated 
under Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush. President George W. Bush 
veered off this path. The Bush tax cuts in particular added more to the debt over 
the last 10 years than any other policy, some $2.5 trillion, and will likely continue 
to be the biggest contributor to additional debt over the next 10 years.48 (see 
Figure 19) Running largely unnecessary deficits in the 2000s left the country in a 
fiscally weaker position to deal with the Great Recession that began in the seventh 
year of the Bush presidency.
The bottom line is that our goal should not simply be getting our deficits out of 
the danger zone. Our goal should be a balanced budget and to achieve that goal 
more revenue is needed.
Reform the tax system
To gain more revenue will require tax increases, but simply raising existing taxes 
without reforming the system would be unfair to American taxpayers and bad for 
the economy. The current system is a mass of loopholes, inequities, unfairness, 
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Figure 19
Presidential debt
Publicly held debt, as a share of GDP, 1980-2008
Source: Office of Management and Budget.
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and complications. It is needlessly convoluted, favoring some industries over oth-
ers for reasons having far more to do with lobbying clout than economic objec-
tives. Taxpayers in similar circumstances pay different tax bills, which is unfair and 
leads to distrust and cynicism. 
As income inequality has grown in recent decades, our tax code has become less 
progressive. The Bush tax cuts for the wealthy failed to generate the promised 
economic benefits, joining other failed “supply-side” experiments of the past. 
(see box on page 41) At the same time, effective federal tax rates dropped sharply, 
sparking the explosive growth of our federal debt. (see Figure 20) 
The individual income tax also is incredibly opaque. One can wade through the form 
instructions, step by step, putting numbers down as directed and have absolutely 
no idea why one is taking the greater of line 15 and line 17, subtracting from line 12, 
and then copying to Form Q. The system has had so many loopholes, exceptions 
to loopholes, political compromises, and random oddities layered on that it simply 
makes no sense anymore. It needs to be cleaned out.
Our current tax system also creates incentives and disincentives that are bad for the 
economy. We have permanent incentives for oil companies when $100 per-barrel 
prices offer ample incentive to drill for more oil, 
and we need to wean ourselves off fossil fuels, 
not subsidize their use. Our efforts to do that, 
however, through federal incentives to boost 
alternative and renewable energy are seriously 
undermined because they are tentative and 
temporary. The tax code is littered with simi-
lar provisions that are intended to encourage 
desired behavior but do so inefficiently, and oth-
ers that promote behaviors that have minimal or 
no public benefit.
The fix
Our tax plan raises needed revenue, makes the 
tax system fair and simple, realigns incentives, 
and eliminates wasteful tax breaks. Specifically, 
our plan:
Figure 20
Falling tax rates for the wealthy versus the rest of us
Effective federal tax rates, 1992-2007
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•	 Makes the individual income tax more sensible, simple, and fair
•	 Lessens our nation’s reliance on foreign oil by imposing a per-barrel fee on oil 
imports and putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions 
•	 Inhibits destructive short-term financial speculation through a new small tax on 
financial sector transactions in stocks, bonds, and derivatives
•	 Raises revenue for the Social Security system as described in our previously 
released Social Security plan55
•	 Eliminates or reforms wasteful and inefficient tax expenditures
•	 Includes a number of smaller-scale revenue enhancements
•	 Raises enough revenue to balance the budget in conjunction with our plan’s 
spending cuts
We detail these measures below and in our appendices beginning on page 57. 
Note that the measures described below comprise our long-term deficit reduction 
plan. We have not included here measures from our previously released plan to 
reach primary balance in 2015, discussed above, that are superseded by our long-
term, more fundamental reform.56
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Ten years ago, President George W. Bush signed the first of two massive 
tax cuts weighted heavily toward the wealthy. The Bush administration 
argued that these cuts would put money in the hands of those people 
best positioned to make investments and create jobs—with benefits 
trickling down to the middle class. Supporters also promised that the 
tax cuts would not lead to deficits. They predicted that even with the 
Bush tax cuts the United States could pay off its debt by 2010.49
What we know all too painfully now is that supply-side tax cut 
policies were, as they have been in the past, an abject failure.50 In 
the 2000s under these policies, even before the Great Recession hit, 
investment growth, job growth, and income growth were all lower 
than during any economic expansion in post-World War II U.S. his-
tory.51 The average employment growth over the period between 
the recessions of 2000-2001 and 2007-2009 was a mere 0.9 percent. 
This compares poorly to the average for postwar periods of economic 
expansion of 3 percent. Investment growth was 2.1 percent during 
the 2000s recovery compared to an average of 6.7 percent during 
past recoveries. And growth in our gross domestic product was 2.7 
percent compared to an historic average of 4.8 percent.52 
The nation’s experience in the 1990s after taxes on the well-off were 
raised under President Clinton is a telling contrast. The supply-side 
eras of President’s Reagan and Bush that bracketed the more progres-
sive tax policies of President Clinton were dismal in terms of econom-
ic performance. Real investment, economic growth, median income, 
wage levels, and employment growth were all better in the Clinton 
era, and, of course, the budget was in surplus instead of being driven 
into massive deficit.53 (see Figure 21)
Supply-side policies are and remain bad news for the middle class. 
Middle-class incomes essentially made no progress under the Bush 
tax regime, which is still in place. After accounting for inflation, me-
dian family income grew at an average rate of 0.06 percent annually 
from business cycle peak to peak in the 2000s. Such slow growth may 
not seem that bad—it’s just staying in place after all—but it’s impor-
tant to note that a stagnant median income hides the vast numbers 
of those whose incomes are going down. When the median income is 
growing strongly it’s a sign that there is a strong economy and most 
people’s incomes are going up even though by varying amounts. 
When the median is unchanged it means that while some family 
incomes are going up, about as many are going down. 
Of course, even the small gains that were achieved during the expan-
sion of the middle 2000s were wiped out by the deep recession that 
hit in 2007—the worst economic downturn since the Great Depres-
sion. There are fewer jobs in the United States today than there were 
in June 2001, when the major Bush tax policies became law.54 
Figure 21
The 1990s economy outperformed supply-side eras
Supply-side tax cuts favoring the wealthy have failed
Source: Michael Ettlinger and John Irons, “Take a Walk on the Supply Side: Tax Cuts on Profits, Savings, and the Wealthy Fail to Spur Economic Growth,” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2008).
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Couple with children earning $75,000 a year
•	 Two dependents
•	 Currently takes the standard deduction
They receive a $1,890 tax cut versus Bush-level taxes
Single with no dependents earning $40,000 a year
•	 $10,000 in itemized expenses
He or she receives a $620 tax cut versus Bush-level taxes 
Couple with children earning $100,000 a year
•	 Two dependents
•	 $20,000 in itemized expenses
They receive a $630 tax cut versus Bush-level taxes 
Couple with children earning $150,000 a year
•	 Two dependents
•	 $28,000 in itemized expenses
They receive a $250 tax cut versus Bush-level taxes 
Our plan and your taxes
Examples of how sample taxpayers would fare under our individual income tax reform plan
Individual income tax
CAP offers a far-reaching overhaul of the individual income tax to make it 
simpler, fairer, and more efficient. Middle-class families are better off under our 
income tax plan because it treats them fairly, simplifies their taxes, and helps 
provide adequate revenue for the investments and public services on which the 
public and businesses rely. Our plan closes loopholes and special tax breaks that 
create unfair disparities among taxpayers. Top income earners, who have enjoyed 
the vast majority of income gains in recent decades even as their taxes have been 
slashed, will be asked to pay more.
Our plan introduces a flat 15 percent rate for couples with incomes under 
$100,000.57 Most taxpayers will pay the same or lower rates than under cur-
rent law, and the top rates on the wealthy are modest by historic standards. (see 
Appendix 1 for full rate tables) The plan eliminates many of the features of the tax 
code that add complexity. Deductions, exemptions, exclusions, and credits are 
eliminated, reformed, or replaced to make them more fair and simple for taxpay-
ers. Loopholes are closed, eliminating the need for an alternative minimum tax 
and high-income phase-outs. The marriage penalty is eliminated. 
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Middle- and low-income taxpayers will pay less income tax under our plan on 
average. High-income taxpayers will pay more but will still enjoy after-tax income 
at levels dramatically higher than they did only a few years ago. Only the top 5 
percent will pay more income tax, on average, relative to the taxes paid under 
President Bush’s policies. Only the top 1 percent will pay more, on average, than 
they would under the tax law as it stood prior 
to President Bush. The bottom 99 percent will, 
on average, pay less income tax. (see Figure 22 
and the accompanying explanatory text box)58 
For middle- and lower-income taxpayers, these 
tax cuts will, on average, more than offset the 
energy taxes described below. 
Changing the structure of the individual 
income tax 
Under our proposal, many loopholes, deduc-
tions, and exemptions are eliminated. These are 
listed in detail in Appendix 1 on page 57. The 
most fundamental change we make that affects 
the most taxpayers is the replacement of item-
Figure 22
Our plan’s income tax changes
Tax change as a percent of income, by income group, relative to 
pre-Bush tax levels and Bush tax levels (see also accompanying 
explanatory box)
Income group
Relative to:
Pre-Bush tax levels Bush tax levels
Bottom 20% -2.9% -2.9%
Second 20% -5.5% -4.6%
Middle 20% -4.9% -3.7%
Fourth 20% -2.6% -1.4%
Next 15% -1.2% 0.0%
Next 4% -0.1% +0.7%
Top 1% +4.1% +6.4%
Source: Quantria Strategies, LLC Individual Income Tax Simulation Model.
Current individual income tax levels adopted under President Bush 
in the early 2000s are set to expire after 2012. This means the tax 
system will largely return to the form it was in before President Bush 
took office. The Congressional Budget Office baseline used for most 
comparisons in this report assumes that the Bush tax cuts expire as 
scheduled. In this section, however, we offer comparisons to both the 
scenario where they expire, which we label as comparisons to “pre-
Bush levels,” and to the scenario where all the Bush tax cuts continue, 
which we label as “Bush levels.” Elsewhere these scenarios are some-
times referred to, respectively, as “current law” and “current policy.”
So in Figure 22 for the middle 20 percent of income earners, for ex-
ample, we see that under our plan personal income tax liability goes 
down by 4.9 percent as a share of their income relative to “pre-Bush 
levels,” and by 3.7 percent relative to “Bush levels.” This means that 
if the Bush tax cuts were allowed to expire, and the tax system were 
to return to pre-Bush law, then our plan would offer middle-quintile 
families, on average, a tax cut worth 4.9 percent of their income. 
Looked at another way, if the family earned an income of $50,000, 
their taxes would go down by 4.9 percent of $50,000 or $2,472. If, 
however, the Bush tax cuts are extended—that is, if the tax system 
is left the same as it is right now in 2011—then when our pro-
posal goes into effect in 2017, the tax cuts will equal 3.7 percent of 
middle-quintile families’ income on average, or $1,862 for a family 
with income of $50,000.
We offer the “Bush levels” comparison because the policy currently in 
place offers an easier reference than policies that were last seen 10 
years ago. But since our policies go into effect in 2017 after the Bush 
tax rules are set to expire, it is useful to see the difference between 
our proposal and what the tax system is scheduled to be in that year.
Our distributional tables explained
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ized deductions, the standard deduction, the personal exemp-
tion, and the dependent exemption with a simpler system of 
credits. In large part this is motivated by the perverse, upside-
down way in which the existing system provides greater benefits 
for deductions, exemptions, and exclusions for higher-income 
taxpayers than middle-income taxpayers as explained further in 
the box on page 45.
Under our system, everyone will get the same level of benefits. 
Instead of “deductions” from income for mortgage interest, 
charitable contributions, or state and local taxes, taxpayers will 
instead receive a direct reduction in their taxes through a 15 per-
cent credit for these payments—with the reduction being the 
same no matter the taxpayer’s income level. 
In addition, most taxpayers will find their tax filing greatly simpli-
fied by the introduction of a generous flat “alternative credit” that 
taxpayers can choose to take instead of taking a credit for their 
itemized expenses. The credit starts at $6,200 for married couples 
and $3,100 for singles, and is indexed for inflation. This alterna-
tive credit works similarly to the current standard deduction: 
Taxpayers will have the choice of claiming the alternative credit 
or adding up itemized expenses and taking the itemized credit. 
Most will take the alternative credit instead of the itemized credit 
because it will offer both lower taxes and simpler filing. 
Personal and dependent exemptions are also eliminated. The 
child credit, however, is broadened to encompass all those who 
had previously qualified for the dependent exemption, renamed 
as the “child and dependent credit,” raised from $1,000 to $1,250, 
and indexed to inflation. This credit is made refundable to a 
greater extent than the existing child credit. The earned income 
tax credit is preserved and strengthened: Improvements put 
in place on a temporary basis by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 are made permanent.59
Some upper-middle-income taxpayers with incomes that put 
them above our 15 percent tax bracket will receive less of a 
benefit under the credit system than they would have if existing 
exemptions and deductions had been preserved as exemptions 
and deductions. But because of the other changes we make to the 
Figure 23
Calculating your income taxes
Current code CAP code
STEP 1
Start with your  
gross income
STEP 5
Subtract exemptions
STEP 9
This is your tax liability 
before credits
STEP 2
Subtract adjustments  
to income
STEP 6
Subtract itemized 
deductions, or standard 
deduction
STEP 10
Subtract credits
STEP 1
Start with your 
gross income
STEP 5
This is your tax liability 
before credits
STEP 2
Subtract adjustments  
to income
STEP 6
Subtract credits
STEP 3
Subtract “above the line” 
deductions
STEP 7
This is your taxable 
income
STEP 11
This is your tax owed, 
unless…
STEP 4
This is your adjusted 
gross income
STEP 8
Find and apply  
your tax rate
STEP 12
Separately calculate AMT 
liability to determine if 
you owe additional taxes
STEP 3
This is your taxable 
income
STEP 7
This is your tax owed
STEP 4
Find and apply  
your tax rate
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system, including lower tax rates in that income 
range, the overall impact on an overwhelming 
majority of middle-income taxpayers will be 
lower personal income tax bills, not higher ones.
One outcome of the change in our tax structure 
described here, and other design improvements 
in the income tax, is that the need for an alter-
native minimum tax and high-income phase-
outs are eliminated—thus greatly simplifying 
tax forms and filing. (see Figure 23) 
The individual income tax rates
For nearly all taxpayers with incomes of less 
than $1 million, the CAP plan offers lower or 
equal marginal tax rates at all taxable income 
levels than existed under President Clinton. 
The rates in the plan are generally lower than or 
equal to the rates under the Bush tax law up to 
One of the more offensive characteristics of the current tax system 
is that a range of subsidies administered through the tax code offer 
greater support for higher-income taxpayers than lower-income 
taxpayers. This is because the interaction of deductions, exemptions, 
and exclusions with graduated income tax rates benefits the former 
over the latter. 
Why? Because the value of such “tax preferences” to a taxpayer is di-
rectly related to the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. For well-off 
taxpayers in the 35 percent tax bracket, their taxes are reduced by 35 
percent of the deduction, exemption, or exclusion. For middle-class 
taxpayers in the 15 percent tax bracket, their taxes are reduced by 
only 15 percent of the deduction, exemption, or exclusion.
This produces outcomes that are indefensible. Imagine anyone open-
ly proposing a subsidy for homeownership that reimburses wealthy 
taxpayers for 35 percent of the interest they pay on the mortgage but 
only 15 percent of what middle-class taxpayers pay. Yet that is pre-
cisely the effect of the mortgage interest deduction. And that is why 
our plan transitions to credits, which are worth the same per dollar of 
interest expense to all taxpayers regardless of their tax bracket.
Of course, changing the mortgage interest deduction suddenly 
would not be fair to those who purchased homes prior to the 
implementation of our plan. So for affected taxpayers, we propose 
an additional credit for home mortgage interest above the basic 
15 percent credit for a 10-year period. This will avoid a disruption 
of housing markets in higher-income areas where the subsidy level 
of housing would be implicitly reduced, and will be fair to those 
who have acted in reliance on a particular level of subsidy. This will 
allow housing markets to adjust in an orderly way. The impact of 
our mortgage interest credit proposal, and the impact of going to 
our itemized credit model, is further explained and discussed in 
Appendix 4 on page 64.
The tax code’s upside-down subsidies
Figure 24
Marginal federal tax rates over time
Ordinary income (wages, self-employment, interest, etc.) and 
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$400,000 of taxable income.60 Our rate struc-
ture also eliminates the “marriage penalty” so 
that a couple does not face higher taxes when 
they get married and file taxes jointly.
For the wealthy, the top tax rate is restored to 
the level it was at under President Clinton dur-
ing the 1990s economic expansion: 39.6 per-
cent. A temporary surtax of 5 percent is added 
for those with incomes of more than $1 million, 
which expires once the federal budget is bal-
anced. This is a marginal tax rate, which means 
that a taxpayer with $1,200,000 in income 
would only pay the surtax on the additional 
$200,000 of income of more than $1 million, or 
a total surtax of $10,000. (see box above)
The top rate will still be lower than during most 
of the postwar period, including our country’s greatest period of economic growth. 
In addition, the top rate for capital gains income from the sale of financial invest-
ments, almost three-quarters of which goes to taxpayers with more than $500,000 
in income, is allowed to return to 28 percent, the same 28 percent level signed into 
law by President Reagan. This rate was in effect for most of the 1990s—a time of 
strong business investment, rising productivity, and very strong economic growth. 
Raising the capital gains rate, in addition to raising additional revenue from the sale 
of investment assets, will help alleviate tax sheltering through accounting gimmicks 
that turn ordinary income into tax-preferred capital gains. (see Figure 24)
There is often confusion regarding the meaning of tax rates, espe-
cially marginal tax rates, which are the rates of tax on one’s last dollar 
of income, not one’s overall tax rate.
Under the CAP plan, married couples pay a 15 percent rate on the first 
$100,000 of income less the tax credits we’ve described. Those credits 
will generally amount to at least the value of our proposed alternative 
credit and any dependent credits: $6,200 for a married couple plus 
$1,250 per child. Above incomes of $100,000, the marginal tax rate 
then goes to 25 percent. 
This does not mean that a couple with $115,000 is paying a 25 per-
cent tax on that $115,000. This couple would pay the 15 percent rate 
on the first $100,000 of their income and then pay 25 percent on the 
amount of income over $100,000—in this case 25 percent of $15,000.
Thus, their pre-credit tax is 15 percent of $100,000 plus 25 percent of 
$15,000, which comes to $18,750. If they choose to take our proposed 
alternative credit and have two children, their income tax bill ends up 
being $10,050. This means that the actual tax they would pay, their 
“effective tax rate,” is less than 9 percent of their income.
Marginal tax rates
Figure 25
Our plan’s income tax changes
Tax change as a percent of income, by income group, relative to 
pre-Bush tax levels and Bush tax levels (see also accompanying 
explanatory box on page 43)
Income group
Relative to:
Pre-Bush tax levels Bush tax levels
Less than $50,000 -5.3% -4.3%
$50,000 to $75,000 -3.3% -2.1%
$75,000 to $100,000 -2.3% -1.1%
$100,000 to $200,000 -1.3% -0.1%
$200,000 to $500,000 0.0% +0.7%
$500,000 to $1 million +1.1% +3.0%
Over $1 million (without surtax) +3.4% +5.9%
Over $1 million (with surtax) +5.4% +7.8%
Source: Quantria Strategies, LLC Individual Income Tax Simulation Model.
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Any proposal to roll back the tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans is 
met with claims that it would harm small business. But the vast ma-
jority of small businesses are owned and run by middle-class taxpay-
ers, who will on average pay lower taxes under our plan. According 
to the Tax Policy Center, only 1.9 percent of filers with small-business 
income are in the top two tax brackets, with the other 98.1 percent 
earning less than $212,300 a year.  
Moreover, even that 1.9 percent includes high-paid lawyers, real es-
tate moguls, owners of large businesses organized as “S corporations,” 
and many wealthy passive investors—not the kind of “mom-and-pop” 
business owners who are misleadingly invoked in defense of massive 
tax cuts for the rich.63 
For the vast majority of middle-class Americans and small-business 
owners, our plan creates a tax system that is much more simple, 
makes compliance and filing much more straightforward, and lowers 
their income taxes. Finally, by removing special-interest loopholes 
that tend to benefit powerful industries, our tax plan allows all busi-
nesses, large and small, to compete on a level playing field.
What about small business?
The most notorious current example of this is the “carried interest” loophole, used 
by managers of hedge funds and private equity funds (some of the wealthiest 
individuals in the country) to pay much lower tax rates on their compensation 
income than average workers. Our plan also specifically closes that loophole. (see 
Appendix 3 on page 61)
Who pays?
Most middle-class taxpayers will pay lower income taxes under the system pro-
posed here, which will, on average, more than offset the additional energy taxes 
described below. All income groups under $200,000 per year will enjoy income 
tax cuts, on average. Even the $200,000 to $500,000 group on average is held 
harmless relative to pre-Bush levels and faces an increase of only 0.7 percent of 
income relative to the Bush tax law—an average increase of $2,076 for this group. 
Overall, relative to the pre-Bush tax law, 65 percent of families and individuals 
would receive a tax cut under our plan, 10 percent would see a tax increase, and 
25 percent would see no change in income tax liability. Relative to the Bush tax 
law, 61 percent of families and individuals would receive a tax cut under our 
plan, 15 percent would see a tax increase, and 24 percent would see no change in 
income tax liability. (see Figure 25)
Or put another way, relative to the pre-Bush tax law, more than 112 million 
families and individuals would see income tax cuts that would average more than 
$2,000. Relative to the Bush tax law, more than 104 million families and indi-
viduals would see tax cuts averaging more than $1,700. 
Our tax code’s system of retirement-savings incentives is another 
example of “upside-down” subsidies. Eighty percent of the benefits 
of retirement tax breaks go to the top 20 percent of income earners.64 
The bottom three-fifths of Americans get only 7 percent of the benefit. 
As the Brookings Institution explains: “These existing tax rules not only 
provide less benefit to those from low- and middle-income house-
holds, but are also relatively ineffective at inducing new saving rather 
than simply shifting other saving into tax-preferred accounts.”65 
The result is that we spend billions of dollars through the tax code 
every year to incentivize savings but we get little return on that in-
vestment in the form of increased savings rates or retirement security 
for most families.66 
Our plan, which draws upon an earlier proposal by former CAP Senior 
Fellow Gene Sperling (now director of President Obama’s National 
Economic Council),67 ameliorates the upside-down problem with 
retirement tax incentives by providing refundable tax credits for all 
savers regardless of their income level or tax bracket. The current 
system of deductions and exclusions for new savings in so-called 
defined-contribution plans (such as 401(k) retirement plans and 
individual retirement accounts) is transformed into a system that 
provides refundable tax credits, equal to 33 percent of employer or 
employee contributions, deposited directly into savings accounts. 
This provides the same savings incentive for all taxpayers—and a 
significantly larger incentive, compared to now, for low- and middle-
income families, who most often find themselves with adequate 
savings as they face retirement.
The primary tax benefit of 401(k)s and IRAs, the tax-deferred accumu-
lation of income, will be maintained for all account holders, keeping 
them as attractive, tax-favored savings vehicles for everyone. With-
drawals from the accounts will be treated the same as they are now. 
Our plan better targets retirement tax incentives at new savings by 
low- and middle-income families, strengthening retirement security 
of those who need it the most. 
Reforming retirement savings 
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Our plan raises taxes on the wealthy although 
not to an extent that will cause any hardship. 
These tax increases on the highest-income tax-
payers would be coming on the heels of substan-
tial tax cuts for the wealthy in recent years. The 
Bush tax cuts gave millionaires in the top 1 per-
cent a tax break 73 times that of middle-income 
families.61 Continuing the Bush bonus tax cuts 
for the wealthy beyond their 2012 expiration 
would cost upwards of $800 billion in the next 
decade alone.62 Given the nation’s fiscal situa-
tion, it is imperative that the wealthy be asked to 
chip in more to the national purse.
Our wealthiest citizens can certainly afford 
what we propose. In most years since 1979, the 
wealthiest 1 percent have, in a single year, seen 
their income jump by more than enough to pay 
for the cost of the tax increase we propose for 
them. (see Figure 26)
Figure 26
The wealthy will be fine
Cumulative after-tax income growth, by income group, since 1979, 
through 2007
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
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Figure 27
Not a great burden
After-tax income growth by income group, 
1979–2007, actual and under CAP plan
Source: Congressional Budget Office and authors’ calculations.
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When put in the context of the amount of income growth 
they’ve enjoyed over the years, the proposed tax increase is 
trivial, but in terms of helping our nation with its fiscal situa-
tion, our proposal is decidedly nontrivial. From 1979 to 2007, 
the earliest and latest years for which reliable official data are 
available, the pretax income of the richest 1 percent has grown 
by 281 percent, nearly quadrupling over that time. Over this 
same 28-year period, the income of the middle 20 percent of 
Americans grew by only 25 percent. 
Against that backdrop, our proposal is to raise the income taxes 
of the top 1 percent by 6.4 percent of their before-tax income. 
To put what we are asking of the very wealthy in perspective, if 
our plan had been in place over this period of time, with the 
temporary millionaire’s surtax in effect, the wealthiest 1 percent 
would still have more than tripled their after-tax income with an 
increase of 246 percent since 1979. (see Figure 27)
The same story applies in a shorter time horizon. The after-tax 
income of the richest 1 percent has risen 60 percent since the 
Bush tax cuts first passed in 2001. If our plan were to go into effect, their incomes 
would have gone up by “only” 46 percent—while middle-income families’ 
incomes were stagnant. 
In the context of changes in after-tax income, our proposal makes very little dif-
ference to the wealthy compared to all they’ve gained. Our tax proposal is hardly 
burdensome on the wealthy and, in the end, they and all Americans will be better 
off for it as we reduce the deficit and make the national investments we need. And 
once the budget is balanced, the surtax on millionaires will be removed. 
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Our tax reform plan also includes other revenue measures designed to make our 
tax system more effective and efficient so the system contributes to broad-based 
economic prosperity. Specifically, we propose:
•	 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and our reliance on foreign oil by putting 
a price on carbon and levying an oil-import fee
•	 Enacting a financial-transactions tax to improve the functioning of our 
financial markets
•	 Enacting business tax reform to rationalize our corporate tax structure
•	 Applying other tax reforms to bolster Social Security, restore the estate tax to 
pre-Bush-era levels, and eliminate wasteful tax expenditures for special interests 
Many of the details about these reforms are found in the appendices beginning on 
page 57 but let’s briefly review each of them here.
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and our reliance on foreign oil 
by putting a price on carbon and levying an oil-import fee 
Our plan addresses the risks and economic damage of our heavy reliance on for-
eign oil and the dangers of climate change by establishing a price on emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases alongside an oil-import fee of $5 per 
barrel. The price on carbon will reduce emissions and at the same time raise rev-
enue to pay for needed investments in a clean energy future. 
Under our plan, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced by 42 percent of 2005 
levels by 2030, and 83 percent of 2005 levels by 2050. Such substantial reductions 
in emissions will combat the harmful effects of climate change on our economy 
and security. Coupled with our investments in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy, a price on carbon will also lead to the creation of new jobs in these fields 
and strengthen U.S. leadership in the growing clean energy economy. 
Other revenue measures
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Any resulting rises in energy prices are, on average, more than offset for low- and 
middle-income taxpayers by the benefits of reduced income taxes and, in the case 
of those who do not owe income tax, by an energy rebate program accounted for 
in our spending proposals. 
Financial transactions tax 
Our plan imposes a small fee on financial transactions, including trading in 
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. In addition to raising revenue from a sector of 
our economy that rebounded quickly from the Great Recession, due in no small 
way to taxpayer support during the financial crisis, a financial transactions tax 
would boost the long-term efficiency of financial markets, improve financial 
market stability, and help direct the allocation of private capital toward critical 
medium- and long-term investments.
Because it is based on the volume of trading, 
this tax creates a disincentive for high-speed 
trading and very short-term speculation and, 
correspondingly, an incentive for long-term 
investment. By reducing financial-market 
volatility, a financial-transactions tax will help 
reduce the asset price risk and improve the 
accuracy of expectations on returns in ways that 
are conducive to greater investment for the real 
economy. After all, the purpose of our financial 
sector is not to generate profits from specula-
tion or high-volume trading but to raise capital 
for the productive sectors of the economy. 
Our proposal levies very modest taxes on each 
kind of financial market transaction. The rates 
vary across different financial instruments and 
are set with the goal of preserving the relative 
costs of transaction across different financial 
asset markets.68 We propose a 0.117 percent tax 
on stocks and stock options trading, a 0.002 
percent tax for bonds, a 0.002 percent tax for 
foreign exchange trading, and a 0.005 percent 
tax for futures and swaps trading.
Figure 28
Composition of federal revenue, as a share of GDP, 
select years 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CBO methodology.
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By tailoring tax rates to transaction costs, our proposal raises revenue from those 
financial institutions that specialize in short-term speculation—often at the 
expense of patient investors. And enabling financial regulators to turn on or off 
the financial transaction tax in extraordinary market circumstances addresses 
concerns over the potential impact on market liquidity and trading volumes.
One potential concern raised about a U.S. financial transactions tax is that it 
would drive trading to overseas financial markets. But this kind of tax is common 
among the United States’s economic rivals. Many countries have had or currently 
level a financial transactions tax, including 14 of 19 among Group of 20 devel-
oped and developing countries, and many countries with large financial centers.69 
Our proposed financial transaction tax is modest when compared to those 
currently imposed in other financial centers, including the United Kingdom 
and Singapore. The U.K. “stamp” tax is 0.5 percent on every stock trade and yet 
London has one of the top stock markets in the world. And Singapore levies a 0.2 
percent tax on each stock trade. Both international experience and theory suggest 
that the risk that the U.S. financial sector will migrate to other countries is small. 
The less than $50 billion in transaction tax revenues raised in 2017 is microscopic 
when compared to the annual financial trading volume in U.S. markets. 
Business tax reform
A pro-growth tax code is one that raises adequate revenue while letting markets, 
not tax considerations, drive investment decisions. Unfortunately, our current 
tax code is replete with loopholes and special subsidies that distort investment 
and impede economic growth.70 Many of these loopholes are simply wasteful and 
ineffective giveaways, among the most egregious being the $4 billion in annual 
tax subsidies for oil companies. Many of these tax loopholes are eliminated under 
our plan, along with many other ineffective or wasteful tax expenditures, including 
special breaks for corporate meals and entertainment, hedge fund managers, coal, 
timber, and agribusiness. A complete list of the tax expenditures our plan reforms 
or eliminates is in Appendix 3 on page 61.
Many companies use a variety of techniques to avoid paying taxes altogether or to 
pay only nominal rates. Our plan adopts several proposals in President Obama’s 
budget to broaden the corporate tax base by addressing international tax loop-
holes. Several of these address corporate tax strategies whereby global companies 
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minimize taxes by shifting income overseas. While the details of comprehensive busi-
ness tax reform are beyond the scope of this project, our proposals begin the process 
of rehabilitating the business tax base while raising a reasonable amount of additional 
revenue from the corporate income tax. 
We believe comprehensive business tax reform should reverse the erosion of the corpo-
rate tax base through the increased use of so-called pass-through businesses that pay no 
corporate income tax but pass through their earnings directly to their owners, and by 
realigning tax incentives toward domestic job creation. It is also important to address 
the abuse of overseas tax havens by corporations and income shifting abroad. These 
reforms would broaden and protect the corporate tax base while potentially allowing for 
a lower corporate rate. 
Other tax reforms
There are a number of other important tax changes in this CAP plan that the Center 
has detailed in previously published reports and which are presented in the appendices 
beginning on page 57. Among those changes:
•	 Remove the cap on the employer side of the payroll tax as described in the CAP Social 
Security plan.71 Currently, the payroll tax to fund Social Security is only applied to 
earned income up to $106,800. Our proposal removes that cap but only on the part of 
the Social Security tax paid by employers, not the part paid by employees.
•	 Restore the estate tax to approximately pre-Bush-tax-cut levels, but indexed for inflation. 
•	 Adopt several revenue proposals in President Obama’s 2011 and 2012 budgets, among 
them extending middle-class tax relief while allowing the high-end Bush tax cuts to 
expire, until our full-blown individual income tax reform goes into effect in 2017. 
•	 Adopt other revenue measures, including an Internet gambling fee and Superfund 
excise tax.
The bottom line on revenue
Overall, our plan raises revenues in 2030 by less than 2 percent of GDP compared to 
the Congressional Budget Office baseline. From there, revenue drops to 23.8 percent 
of GDP by 2035, just half a percentage point above the baseline. Most importantly, 
our plan raises enough revenue to balance the budget without handing the bill to the 
middle class.
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Conclusion
The concern in Washington about our nation’s fiscal situation is sincere. But the 
barriers to progress are not merely political. The barriers reflect major disagree-
ments about the future of our country. The Center for American Progress view is 
embodied in the plan presented here.
We believe the debate over whether government is too big or too small is too 
abstract to be useful. It’s not about the size of government; it’s about what we, as 
a society, are better off accomplishing as a people rather than individually. At the 
most extreme, we could confine the size of government to a short list of activities 
that existed early in our nation’s history. A court system, a military, a common 
currency, the issuing of patents—these are certainly important functions of the 
federal government; but today our nation needs a 21st century government, not 
an 18th century version.
The role of the federal government has grown over our nation’s life for good reason. 
This expansion came in response to the need to address real problems. Whether it’s 
the need of the elderly for Medicare, the importance of educating our children, the 
desire for airliners to be safe, or the simple public health imperative of safe food and 
drinking water, the government has assumed a role in these areas in response to 
legitimate needs. As our country has grown and our lives have become more compli-
cated, the federal government has had to grow as well. Hamstringing government 
will not make the world less big and complicated—it will just leave everyone on 
their own to deal with challenges that really can only be dealt with collectively. 
That doesn’t mean, of course, that every expansion of the role of the federal gov-
ernment has been a good one. Nor does it mean that everything the government 
does is done well. But focusing on some arbitrary goal for the size of government 
is the wrong way to address those problems. Instead, we need to be having a seri-
ous discussion, subject by subject, about what government should be doing and 
how. We do not want to spend taxpayer dollars frivolously or spend them inef-
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ficiently. And in the end, once we identify the important activities of government, 
those that are worth their cost in terms of economic growth, meeting our obliga-
tions, and improving the well-being of Americans, we should take responsibility 
for paying for them.
In this report we engage in that discussion. We have prioritized activities that the 
federal government can engage in to grow our economy, and those activities that 
private interests, left to their own devices, won’t deliver. We protect and enhance 
public services that, simply put, make people’s lives better and safer. And for 
national challenges that are best addressed collectively, we employ our strongest 
mechanism for collective action: the federal government. 
There are many reasons that America rose to greatness. The individual contributions 
of millions over the last 235 years built our country. We invented the great inven-
tions, built the great corporations. But even though we may all want to think of our-
selves as brave homesteaders out on the range building our lives without any outside 
help, that’s not the only way it happened. Even those homesteaders benefited from 
the decision to grant the rights to those lands not to the highest bidders, but instead 
to those who were willing to work the land. It isn’t the government’s job to build the 
nation brick by brick, but there are public investments our nation needs, and there 
is a role in making a country that offers hope, promise, and security, and builds a 
strong middle class. 
Of all the amazing American innovations, surely the greatest is our democracy itself. 
By giving voice to the many instead of just the few, we have built a country gov-
erned by those who are dedicated to and dependent on its future. The vast majority 
of Americans can’t put their children in private schools or individually endow sci-
entific research. And these Americans know that roads and bridges are important 
to their communities and their future. They know that their fortunes are tied to the 
fortunes of their country. That is why we believe that our plan is not only best for 
America but that, in the long run, it is not far from what Washington must do. 
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Figure 29
Comparison of federal income tax brackets, with Bush tax cuts, without Bush tax cuts, and under 
CAP reform
Couples
With Bush tax cuts Without Bush tax cuts CAP plan
Marginal rate Over But not over Marginal rate Over But not over Marginal rate Over But not over
10% $0 $17,000 15% $0 $69,000 15% $0 $100,000 
15% $17,000 $69,000 28% $69,000 $139,350 25% $100,000 $150,000 
25% $69,000 $139,350 31% $139,350 $212,300 30% $150,000 $400,000 
28% $139,350 $212,300 36% $212,300 $379,150 39.60% $400,000 -
33% $212,300 $379,150 39.60% $379,150 -
35% $379,150 -
Singles
With Bush tax cuts With 2001-03 tax cuts expired CAP plan
Marginal rate Over But not over Marginal rate Over But not over Marginal rate Over But not over
10% $0 $8,500 15% $0 $34,500 15% $0 $50,000 
15% $8,500 $34,500 28% $34,500 $83,600 25% $50,000 $75,000 
25% $34,500 $83,600 31% $83,600 $174,400 30% $75,000 $200,000 
28% $83,600 $174,400 36% $174,400 $379,150 39.60% $200,000 -
33% $174,400 $379,150 39.60% $379,150 -
35% $379,150 -
Notes: Bracket thresholds for heads of households are halfway between those for joint filers and singles. “With” and “Without Bush Tax Cuts” brackets are 2011 levels unadjusted for projected inflation.
APPEnDIx 1
Individual income tax rate structure 
in the CAP plan
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Estate tax
As a temporary measure in our plan to reach primary balance in 2015, our plan 
adopts President Obama’s proposal to return the estate tax to its 2009 parameters 
starting in 2012. 
In 2017, at the same time that our comprehensive income tax reform plan would 
go into effect, our plan roughly reinstates the estate tax as it existed before the 
presidency of George W. Bush, but with higher exemption levels. The exemption 
was $1.35 million per couple in 2000 and 2001. Under our plan it is indexed for 
inflation from a baseline of $2 million in 2001 so that in 2017, the first year our 
plan takes effect, it will be about $2.8 million per couple. Thus, under our plan, a 
married couple would be able to pass on $2.8 million to their heirs tax free. This 
would exempt close to 99 percent of all estates from the estate tax altogether.72
The small fraction of estates larger than $2.8 million would pay estate tax on the 
value of the estate that exceeds that amount according to a progressive rate sched-
ule ranging from 18 percent to 55 percent. The top 55 percent is the same or lower 
than it was for nearly seven decades from 1934 through 2001.73 Special provisions 
that make compliance easier for the very few small businesses and farms that are 
subject to the tax would be continued. We are not opposed to other responsible 
changes to the tax that are revenue neutral relative to our proposal.
CAP Social Security plan
Our plan relies on two revenue proposals to ensure the 75-year solvency of Social 
Security. As described in CAP’s report “Building It Up, Not Tearing It Down,” we 
propose that:
APPEnDIx 2
Other revenue proposals  
in the CAP plan
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•	 The cap on the employer side of the payroll tax is removed. Currently, the pay-
roll tax to fund Social Security is only applied to earned income up to $106,800. 
Our proposal removes that cap but only on the part of the Social Security tax 
paid by employers, not the part paid by employees.
•	 Cafeteria plan benefits are treated as wages, similarly to salary-reduction contri-
butions to 401(k) plans, for purposes of calculating the employer share of the 
Social Security tax.74
Revenue proposals in President Obama’s fiscal year 2012 budget
As part of the necessary steps toward achieving primary balance in 2015, our plan 
adopts several of the revenue proposals in President Obama’s FY 2012 budget. 
Some of these are incorporated into our long-term proposal while others are 
superceded. The proposals include:
•	 Extending expiring tax cuts, including the 2001-2003 Bush-era tax cuts, for 
families with incomes of less than $250,000 ($200,000 for singles) while allow-
ing the high-end tax cuts to expire on schedule at the end of 2012. This includes 
extending the current tax brackets for middle-class taxpayers, maintaining the 
$1,000 child credit, and maintaining the earned income tax credit enhancements 
implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. These 
changes are superceded by comprehensive income tax reform starting in 2017.
•	 Adopting the international tax reform proposals in the FY 2012 budget. These 
proposals are incorporated into our long-term revenue projections.
•	 Repealing tax expenditures—including fossil-fuel subsidies; the carried interest 
loophole for hedge fund and private equity fund managers; and the so-called last-
in-first-out, or LIFO, and lower-cost-or-market, or LCM, inventory methods.
•	 Limiting itemized deductions to 28 percent. This is superceded by our compre-
hensive income tax reform in 2017.
•	 Limiting certain aggressive strategies used to reduce estate and gift taxes.
•	 Imposing a systemic risk fee of 0.15 percent on liabilities of large financial firms 
with more than $50 billion of assets.
•	 Reinstating Superfund taxes to make polluters pay for environmental  
cleanup efforts.
60 center for American progress | Budgeting for Growth and prosperity
•	 Extending relief from the alternative minimum tax for the middle class by  
indexing it through 2016. The AMT is eliminated as part of our comprehensive 
income tax reform in 2017.
•	 Permanently extending the research tax credit.
Millionaire’s surtax
As described in our report “The First Step: A Progressive Plan for Meaningful 
Deficit Reduction by 2015,” we propose a temporary surtax on adjusted gross 
income of more than $1 million beginning in 2015. The surtax is 2 percent on 
income of more than $1 million and less than $10 million, and 5 percent on 
income of more than $10 million.75 This surtax is superceded by our broader 
reform that goes into effect in 2017. 
Alcohol and tobacco excise taxes
Our proposal raises revenues from activities that lead to poor health and increased 
health care costs. The plan increases the existing federal excise tax on cigarettes 
by 50 cents per pack and raises various existing federal excise taxes on alcoholic 
beverages to a single levy of $16 per proof gallon for all alcoholic beverages.
License fees on Internet gambling
Our proposal imposes a regulatory framework for Internet gambling and col-
lects a license fee from each authorized site equal to 2 percent of deposits into 
gambling accounts, with unauthorized bets or wagers subject to a 50 percent fee. 
Required information returns and withholding would enable proper collection of 
gambling winnings. The proposals mirror those in H.R. 2268 (111th Congress), 
offered by Rep. McDermott.76
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Tax expenditures reformed under the CAP revenue plan
•	 Itemized deductions. Itemized deductions replaced with 15 percent itemized cred-
its. Mortgage interest credit is limited to $25,000 in mortgage interest incurred to 
acquire, build, or improve a primary residence, or to refinance an existing mortgage. 
Transition credit available for existing homeowners. (see Appendix 4 for more detail)
•	 Retirement savings incentives. Deductions for contributions to defined contribution 
retirement savings accounts replaced with a 33 percent refundable tax credit depos-
ited directly into the account. Annual per-person contributions limited to $15,000 or 
15 percent of adjusted gross income.
•	 Step-up in basis at death. Currently, gains on assets fully escape income taxation when 
they are bequeathed to heirs because the heirs’ “basis” in the asset is deemed to be 
the asset’s fair market value at the time of the decedent’s death. Our proposal replaces 
the current step-up in basis to 100 percent of the property’s fair market value at death 
with a step-up in basis to 50 percent of its fair market value, unless the heirs can 
establish that the decedent’s basis was higher.
•	 Exclusion from income of interest on state and local public purpose bonds. Our plan 
reduces the cost of this tax expenditure by reinstating Build America Bonds 
introduced in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and limiting 
tax-exempt bonds.77 
•	 Preferential capital gains rates. Capital gains taxed as ordinary income with 28 percent 
maximum rate—the level the rate was from 1987–1997. 
•	 American Opportunity Tax Credit. Made permanent and converted to an itemized credit.
•	 Deferral of income of foreign subsidiaries. International tax reforms adopted from 
President Obama’s FY 2012 budget proposals reduce ability of multinational 
corporations to shift income abroad to defer U.S. taxes.
APPEnDIx 3
Tax expenditures reformed or 
eliminated under the CAP plan
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Tax expenditures eliminated under the CAP revenue plan
•	 Fossil-fuel tax expenditures
 – Enhanced oil recovery credit
 – Credit for oil and gas produced from marginal wells
 – Expensing of intangible drilling costs
 – Deduction for tertiary injectants
 – Exception to passive loss limitation for working interests in oil and natural  
gas properties
 – Percentage depletion for oil and natural gas wells
 – Domestic manufacturing deduction for oil and natural gas companies
 – Geological and geophysical amortization period for independent producers 
increased to seven years
•	 Coal tax expenditures
 – Expensing of exploration and development costs
 – Percentage depletion for hard mineral fossil fuels
 – Capital gains treatment for royalties
 – Domestic manufacturing deduction for coal and other hard mineral fossil fuels
•	 Timber tax expenditures
 – Expensing of multiperiod timber growing costs
 – Capital gains treatment of certain timber income
•	 Agriculture tax expenditures
 – Capital gains treatment of certain income from agricultural sales
 – Expensing of certain multiperiod agricultural production costs
 – Expensing of certain capital outlays including fertilizer and feed
•	 Exclusion of “inside buildup” of life insurance
•	 Carried interest loophole 
•	 Preferential dividend rates: dividends taxed as ordinary income
•	 Business meals and entertainment deduction
•	 Foreign earned income exclusion
•	 Exemption of credit union income
•	 Exemption of income of certain insurance companies operated by  
tax-exempt organizations
•	 Special Blue Cross Blue Shield deduction
•	 Exception from passive loss rules for $25,000 in rental loss
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•	 Exclusion of employer-provided parking reimbursements
•	 Exclusion of interest on private purpose bonds
•	 Last-in-first-out, or LIFO, and lower-cost-or-market, or LCM, accounting methods
•	 Health savings accounts and flexible spending accounts
•	 Itemized deduction for state and local sales taxes 
•	 Ethanol tax credits
•	 Child and dependent care credit 
•	 Employer subsidies for child and dependent care
•	 Tax expenditures for higher education other than the American Opportunity 
Tax Credit
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Sustainable homeownership strengthens communities and helps families build 
financial security. But the mortgage interest deduction in its current form, with a 
cost of more than $100 billion per year, is an expensive and badly targeted incen-
tive for homeownership. It provides a much greater subsidy for wealthy home-
owners in top tax brackets because of the so-called “upside-down” effect: A $100 
deduction is worth $35 to a taxpayer in the 35 percent tax bracket and only $15 
to a taxpayer in the 15 percent bracket. (The “upside-down” effect is explained fur-
ther in the text box on page 45.) This disparity is worsened by the fact that wealthy 
taxpayers can deduct interest on mortgages up to $1.1 million in size and mort-
gages for vacation homes. Wealthy taxpayers receive subsidies from the mortgage 
interest deduction up to 10 times as large as middle-class families:78
At the same time, reforming the mortgage interest deduction is difficult because 
it is deeply ingrained in our economy. Millions of current homeowners took out 
mortgages with the expectation of a tax deduction at their marginal tax rates. The 
value of the existing deduction is factored into the current value of their homes. 
We are conscious that now is a precarious moment for the housing sector. 
Foreclosures have battered communities in all corners of America. House prices 
APPEnDIx 4
Reforming the mortgage interest 
deduction carefully and equitably
Figure 30
The “upside-down” effect
Benefits of mortgage interest tax break by income level
Household 
income
< $40,000
$40,000–
$75,000
$75,000–
$125,000
$125,000–
$250,000
$250,000+
Average tax savings 
from the mortgage 
interest deduction
$91 $523 $1,264 $2,703 $5,459
Source: James Poterba and Todd Sinai, “Tax-Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing: Deductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest 
and the Exclusion of Imputed Rental Income,” available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~sinai/papers/Poterba-Sinai-2008-ASSA-final.pdf.
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have declined significantly, with negative effects throughout the economy. Fully 
23 percent of Americans are currently “underwater” on their mortgages—that is, 
they owe more than their homes are currently worth. 
What’s more, there is a significant likelihood for other policy changes over time 
that could also weaken home values. One almost certain change over time is lower 
loan limits for loans eligible for purchase and inclusion in Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac mortgage-backed securities and Federal Housing Administration mortgage 
insurance, which will likely reduce liquidity and raise costs for higher dollar 
mortgages, thus reducing the availability of credit and the pool of eligible buyers, 
putting downward pressure on the value of higher-priced homes. And then there 
are the specific housing markets that have the highest concentrations of high-cost 
homes, so these policy changes may have a disproportionate impact on families in 
these communities. 
For these reasons, the transition to a more equitable and efficient homeownership 
incentive must be undertaken with great caution. Given the size of the federal 
budget deficit, however, we simply cannot afford to leave in place an untargeted 
and hugely expensive subsidy. So we must target the mortgage interest deduction 
more carefully to those for whom it is a significant factor in expanding access to 
homeownership and the benefits it brings to strengthening communities. 
Those changes must be accomplished gradually with a clear eye on the impact 
on middle-class families. Therefore the CAP plan proceeds in increments, 
with transition relief for affected homeowners. And we offer the reform in the 
context of a plan that will reduce the average federal income tax burden, on 
average, for the bottom 95 percent of households. Specifically, in 2015 we adopt 
President Obama’s proposal to limit the value of all itemized deductions, includ-
ing mortgage interest, to 28 percent. This proposal would reduce the value of all 
deductions (including the mortgage interest deduction) only for taxpayers in 
the 33 percent and 35 percent tax brackets. 
Starting in 2017 the mortgage interest deduction is reformed into an itemized 
credit with important transition rules to protect homeowners. Taxpayers in 
all brackets may choose to claim a credit worth 15 percent of their qualifying 
mortgage expense. The maximum amount of mortgage interest that will qualify 
for the credit is $25,000. For mortgages originated in 2017 and later, the credit 
will be limited to interest on debt incurred to acquire, build, or improve a primary 
residence, or to refinance an existing mortgage. 
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Thus, the mortgage interest deduction becomes a 15 percent itemized credit. The 
new credit is much fairer than the existing deduction, providing the same tax ben-
efit per dollar of mortgage interest to taxpayers regardless of their tax bracket, and 
within a limit of $25,000 in interest (the amount of interest a homeowner would 
pay in the first year of a $500,000 mortgage at 5 percent interest).
Out of fairness to current mortgage holders, and to minimize disruptions in the 
housing market, transition relief is available to homeowners in tax brackets above 
15 percent. In 2017 affected homeowners—those in tax brackets above 15 per-
cent—will be eligible for an additional 10 percent transition credit. Combined 
with the 15 percent itemized credit for mortgage interest, taxpayers will essentially 
be able to take a 25 percent credit for mortgage interest expense (equivalent to a 
deduction capped at 25 percent as under the Obama proposal). 
Each year after 2017, the transition credit is reduced by 1 percent, until fully elimi-
nated in 2027. The plan therefore gradually reduces the maximum value of the 
mortgage interest deduction from the current maximum of 35 percent, to 28 per-
cent in 2015, then essentially to 25 percent in 2017. It is reduced by 1 percentage 
point every year until 2027, when the mortgage interest deduction has been fully 
transformed into a flat 15 percent credit.
We believe that such a gradual phase-down of the mortgage interest deduction 
into a credit over a 16-year timeframe will mitigate the impact on the value of 
higher-cost homes. Specifically, the gradual phase-in provides sufficient time for 
house price appreciation to overwhelm any impact on home values. We believe 
the reform should not cause significant harm to housing markets. 
In fact, the United Kingdom fully phased out its mortgage interest subsidy during 
the 1990s with no negative impact on homeownership rates.79 And in the years 
after Britain announced its phase-out of mortgage interest relief, U.K. home prices 
actually grew faster than U.S. home prices. Our plan is more incremental, as it 
leaves in place a 15 percent itemized credit for mortgage interest. We believe it 
represents a careful, fiscally responsible approach to making the mortgage interest 
tax expenditure more efficient and equitable.
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APPEnDIx 5
Timeline of CAP revenue proposals
2012
•	 Revenue proposals in President’s budget and CAP Social Security plan implemented
•	 Some tax expenditures eliminated
2013
•	 Tax cuts extended for middle class families
•	 Bush tax cuts for the wealthy expire
•	 Estate tax returned to 2009 parameters
2015
•	 CAP’s First Step revenue proposals implemented:
 – 2 percent surtax on income above $1 million
 – 3 percent additional surtax on income above $10 million
 – oil import fee
 – tax expenditures eliminated or reduced
•	 Revenue from cigarettes, alcohol, internet gambling
2017
•	 Comprehensive income tax reform supercedes earlier changes
•	 5 percent surtax on income above $1 million
•	 Price imposed on carbon
•	 Financial transactions tax implemented
•	 Estate tax reform
2030
•	 Budget balanced - millionaire surtax expires
2033
•	 Large budget surplus—10 percent reduction in income taxes
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APPEnDIx 6
The federal budget under the CAP plan, 2012-2035
Figure 30
Federal spending, revenue, deficits and debt, as a percent of GDP, 2012-2035, under CAP plan
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20
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34
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35
Social Security 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9
Medicare, Medicaid 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.8
Security 5.1 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2
All else 6.3 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0
Net Interest 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3
Total outlays 23.5 23.1 23.0 22.3 22.7 23.2 23.2 23.6 23.8 23.8 24.0 24.0 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.0 24.0 23.9 23.9 23.8 23.6 23.5 23.3 23.2
Existing revenue sources, 
as reformed
16.3 18.5 19.3 19.6 19.7 20.6 21.0 21.0 21.1 21.3 21.5 21.7 21.8 22.0 22.1 22.3 22.5 22.7 22.9 22.9 23.1 23.3 22.5 22.7
Oil import fee and price 
on carbon
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Financial Transactions Tax 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total revenue 16.3 18.5 19.3 19.7 19.8 21.4 22.0 22.0 22.1 22.3 22.4 22.6 22.8 23.0 23.1 23.3 23.5 23.7 23.9 23.9 24.1 24.3 23.5 23.8
Deficit 7.1 4.7 3.7 2.6 2.9 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6
Debt 74.1 76.1 76.4 75.6 75.2 74.1 72.5 71.5 70.6 69.7 68.9 67.5 66.5 64.9 63.4 61.6 59.7 57.7 55.2 52.7 50.0 47.1 44.7 42.3
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